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Abstract of Thesis
The chapters of this thesis comprise three separate studies on topics in behavioral
and development economics. The first chapter discusses the impact of advantageous
and disadvantageous income inequality on self-reported life satisfaction. The second
chapter analyses the effect of access to financial services in rural India on agricultural
outcomes. In the third chapter I introduce a new instrumental variable to identify
the effect of peer expenditure on household consumption.
Chapter 1. Spiteful Preferences or Inequality Aversion: What drives
the Comparison Income Effect? In this chapter I use happiness data to distin-
guish between spiteful and inequality averse preferences. Both are consistent with
the Easterlin paradox but have quite different implications for the relationship be-
tween happiness and income inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that happiness
is decreasing in the income of relevant others (i.e. comparison income). On its own,
this relationship provides insufficient evidence to pin down the underlying prefer-
ences but a remedy is available. The simple comparison income model is nested in
a more general utility function which accounts for several types of interdependent
preferences. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey, I
demonstrate that the full model has more predictive power than the reduced one.
Moreover, aversion to income inequality appears to drive the comparison income
effect. The results are robust to several alternative model specifications.
Chapter 2. Rural Banks and Agricultural Production: Evidence from
India’s Social Banking Experiment In this chapter, we study the effects of
improved access to banking services on agricultural production in India. We exploit
a series of policy rules during the 1980s to generate a time-varying instrument for
rural branch expansion at the district level. We find that a 1% growth in rural
banks increased aggregate yields by 0.4%. This effect is driven by an uptake in the
cultivation of higher-yielding varieties of cereal crops, as well as an increase in the
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area share allocated to cash crops. Banks also attenuate the effect of lagged rainfall
on output, via changes in the use of irrigation.
Consumption-savings decisions with interdependent preferences. Stay-
ing ahead or catching up? In the third chapter, I estimate the effect of expendi-
ture disparity on household consumption using a novel instrumental variable. In a
life-cycle setting, households are assumed to care about the distance to others above
and below them in the expenditure distribution. To solve the endogeneity problem
arising from correlated and exogenous effects, I instrument expenditure disparity
with the share of households who receive unexpected windfall income. Using SOEP
data, the average household is found to have envious and prideful preferences in that
growing disparity to those who spend more and reduction in the disparity to others
who spend less is associated with consumption expenditure growth.
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Lay Summary
A large number of empirical studies find that the income of relevant others (i.e.
comparison income) affects self-reported life satisfaction (i.e. happiness). Moreover,
happiness and comparison income are found to be inversely related and it is often
assumed that this implies happiness is also decreasing in income inequality. This
is a logical fallacy. There are plausible models of relative concerns in which social
standing matters and yet utility is increasing in inequality by reducing conspicu-
ous consumption. The first chapter separates attitudes towards income inequality
from comparison income effects. The standard model used to estimate comparison
income effects is nested in a general utility framework that allows to distinguish be-
tween inequality aversion and competitive preferences. For this reason, it is easy to
statistically compare the relative fit of both models. Using data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), I find that the general model has significantly more
predictive power than the reduced model. This is the first study to establish this
result. To pin down the preferences underlying the comparison income effect, I es-
timate the marginal effects of individual specific advantageous and disadvantageous
income inequality on happiness directly. Controlling for own income, individuals
appear to be on average averse to both advantageous and disadvantageous income
inequality. This result is important because it rules out other types of interdepen-
dent preferences (such as spiteful preferences) for the average individual, that are
consistent with the comparison income effect and thereby reconciles empirical and
experimental findings.
The marginal effect of income inequality on self-reported happiness is consistent
across various exogenously determined subsets of relevant others (i.e. the reference
groups) to whom individuals are assumed to compare. Consider reference groups
defined according to occupation type, age-cohort and gender of the individual. Ev-
erything else being equal, a 100% increase in net real monthly income is associated
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with a non-causal increase in reported life satisfaction of 19% of a standard-deviation.
Holding own income fixed, an increase in the average income distance to better-off
others by EUR 1,000 is associated with a reduction in reported satisfaction by ap-
proximately 7% of a standard-deviation. This result suggests that an increase in
monthly income of the average individual by 100% does not change perceived well-
being, if at the same time the average distance to richer individuals’ monthly income
increases by approximately EUR 2,500. The negative effect of advantageous income
inequality is relatively smaller. An increase in the average income distance to worse-
off others by EUR 1,000 reduces satisfaction by approximately 2% of a standard-
deviation of self-reported life satisfaction. Therefore, a 100% increase in income is
predicted to leave happiness unchanged, if at the same time the average monthly
income distance to poorer individuals increases by approximately EUR 11,000 –an
unrealistically large amount given the average net deflated income of about EUR
1,700. This suggests that individuals are on average averse to disadvantageous and,
to a lesser extend, advantageous income inequality. The outcomes do not appear to
be driven by estimation methodology.
Evidence from game-theoretic experiments suggests that there is considerable
heterogeneity among attitudes towards payoff inequality. To account for some of
this heterogeneity, I estimate attitudes towards income inequality conditional on ob-
servable characteristics such as age-cohort, gender, residency in the states of the
former GDR, and self-reported political conviction. Both relatively young and old
individuals are on average more averse to advantageous income inequality than the
comparison cohort. While both genders appear to be negatively affected by ad-
vantageous income inequality, disadvantageous income inequality affects men more
strongly. In all specifications, the results imply that Eastern Germans are on average
more averse to income inequality than Western Germans. Given the communist past
of the former GDR, this result suggests that interdependent preferences in a society
are influenced by norms. Consistent with these findings, politically left-leaning in-
dividuals are found to be more strongly affected by income inequality than rightists
or centrists. On the other hand, right-leaning individuals appear to have upward
looking preferences in that they are not affected by changes in the income distance
to worse-off others.
In the second chapter my co-authors and I study the effect of access to financial
services on agricultural outcomes. Improving access to formal banking and financial
services has long been seen as a key tool to reducing poverty in developing countries.
vii
Recent empirical research has shown its effectiveness in this regard –also in India.
Despite this, we know relatively little about the underlying pathways through which
access to banks can lead to reductions in poverty. In this paper, we use district-level
panel data to study India’s government-led rural banking program in the 1980s to
shed light on these potential pathways, focusing on agricultural production. Ac-
cess to banking services has the potential to increase agricultural productivity, and
thereby rural incomes, via three leading pathways. First, such services may help
individual farmers to overcome liquidity constraints, which can cause under-usage
of inputs. We investigate this by analyzing the impact of bank growth on agricul-
tural yields, as well as the use of inputs including land, irrigation, seeds, fertilizers
and machinery. Second, bank credit can help improve intertemporal consumption
smoothing, and therefore increase farmers’ willingness to engage in riskier but more
profitable activities. We assess this potential channel by considering changes in
crop portfolio over time in response to bank growth, specifically shifts towards more
volatile but higher return crops. Third, banks can provide some insurance against
adverse weather shocks. To test for this, we examine whether banks attenuate the
relationship between lagged rainfall and contemporaneous production.
Our results show that improved access to banks did significantly increase agri-
cultural yields and production. Specifically, a 1% growth in banks is associated with
a 0.4% growth in yields. To decompose this relationship further, we document an
increase in the use of relatively more expensive but higher-yielding variety (HYV)
seeds for cereal cultivation. Moreover, bank growth appears to shift the overall port-
folio towards more cash crops and double-cropping during the winter season. Finally,
we find banks had an attenuating influence on the negative effects of lagged rainfall
shocks through changes in the use of irrigation resources. Evaluating the causal im-
pacts of formal banking services on agricultural production in a non-experimental
setting is challenging. For example, banks may choose to open new branches in the
most productive regions at baseline, but lower growth potential, leading OLS to un-
derestimate the true effects. In contrast, banks may choose to open new branches in
regions with lower baseline productivity, but higher growth potential, leading OLS
to overestimate the true effects. In order to address these potential biases, we ex-
ploit a series of central-government regulations, aimed explicitly at expanding the
rural banking infrastructure in India during the 1980s, to generate a time-varying
instrument for bank growth at the district level.
From 1978 to 1990, three consecutive periods of Branch Licensing Policies (BLPs)
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guided the spread of banking infrastructure in India. Instigated to ensure a more
equitable distribution of banking facilities across the country, the BLPs regulated
the location of new branches towards unbanked regions. Using a target population-
per-branch ratio (set to the national average at the onset of each period), a district
was identified as deficit if found to be above the stipulated threshold. If classified
as such, the district was assigned a detailed branch expansion program. Compliance
was monitored at the end of each period, when districts were reclassified based on
their updated population-per-branch ratio. Our identification strategy leverages the
fact that the same district can be deficit in one period, and non-deficit another.
Such policy-induced changes in bank growth within a district over time allows us
to estimate more accurately the causal impacts of this major expansion in banking
infrastructure in 20th century India. To test the validity of this empirical strategy
more formally, we carry out a number of placebo tests that show the instrument
to be uncorrelated with potentially confounding factors such as growths in physi-
cal infrastructure (namely road networks), market development, other government
policies such as preferential lending to agriculture. Furthermore, we show that the
instrument is uncorrelated with pre-trends in our outcomes.
The third chapter is dedicated to measuring the effect of expenditure disparity on
household consumption choices. Status seeking and habit formation are important
characteristics of human behavior. A growing number of empirical studies account
for inter-household comparisons and find measurable effects on consumption choices.
The empirical results are typically obtained from exploiting restrictions placed on the
optimal consumption path. The utility function accounts for relative concerns with
respect to a predefined reference group. The crucial problem with the identification
of peer effects models of this type is related to the reflection problem of Manski
(1993): A priori, it is difficult to distinguish the endogenous effect of peer expendi-
ture on household consumption from unobserved exogenous and correlated effects.
Inconsistency from exogenous peer effects arises if members of the reference group
share characteristics that affect their consumption choice in a similar manner. For
example, the age cohort of households may be a determinant of reference group affil-
iation which also affects expenditure profiles. If the households in a reference group
face disturbances that affect their expenditure in a similar way due to common un-
observable traits, the peer effects model is inconsistent due to correlated effects. For
example, regional fluctuations and economic growth may affect permanent incomes
and thereby expenditures within a reference group in a similar way.
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To account for the reflection problem, I instrument expenditure disparity with
the share of households in the reference group who receive windfall income. Here,
windfall income is defined as unexpected income gain from inheritances, gifts, or
lottery wins above EUR 2,500. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper
that makes use of unexpected income shocks from inheritances, gifts, and lottery
wins as an instrumental variable for average expenditure disparity.
To pin down the direction of comparisons, I decompose the effect of average peer
expenditures into disparity to those with higher (i.e. disadvantageous disparity) and
lower (i.e. advantageous disparity) expenditures. Interdependent preferences may
be characterized by upward or downward comparisons in that only the expenses of
households above or below in the expenditure distribution matter to the household
who makes the comparison. The results indicate that expenditure growth is positive
in the distance to others higher up in the distribution. Likewise, increases in the
distance to households with lower expenditure lead to reduced household expendi-
ture. The relative size of these effects varies across reference group specifications.
For reference groups defined by education, age-cohort, and cohabitation status, a
1% increase in disadvantageous disparity is related to an increase in household con-
sumption of approximately 0.2% Likewise, an increase in advantageous disparity by
1% is related to a decrease in household consumption by approximately 0.22%.
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Chapter 1
Spiteful Preferences or Inequality
Aversion: What drives the
Comparison Income Effect?
1.1 Introduction
A large number of empirical studies find that the income of relevant others (i.e.
comparison income) affects self-reported life satisfaction (i.e. happiness) scores1.
Moreover, happiness and comparison income are found to be inversely related and
it is often assumed that this implies happiness is also decreasing in income inequal-
ity. However, as Hopkins (2008) notes, this is a logical fallacy. There are plausible
models of relative concerns2 in which social standing matters and yet welfare is
increasing in inequality by reducing conspicuous consumption. This chapter disen-
tangles attitudes towards income inequality from comparison income effects. The
standard model used to estimate comparison income effects is nested in the more
general Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (henceforth F&S) utility framework. It therefore
is easy to statistically compare the relative fit of both models. Using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), I find that the F&S model has significantly
more predictive power than the comparison income model. This is the first paper to
establish this result. To pin down the preferences underlying the comparison income
1see for example van de Stadt et al. (1985); Clark and Oswald (1994); McBride (2001); Senik
(2004); Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005); Luttmer (2005); Clark et al. (2008). Clark and Senik (2010)
summarize the existing literature.
2See for example Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) for a model of status competition in which
greater equality leads to welfare-reducing conspicuous consumption.
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effect, I estimate the marginal effects of individual specific advantageous and dis-
advantageous income inequality on happiness directly. Controlling for own income,
individuals appear to be on average averse to both advantageous and disadvanta-
geous income inequality. This result is important because it rules out other types
of interdependent preferences that are consistent with the comparison income effect
and thereby reconciles empirical and experimental findings.
The marginal effect of income inequality on self-reported happiness is consistent
across various specifications. Consider reference groups defined according to occu-
pation, age-cohort and gender. Everything else equal, a 100% increase in net real
monthly income is associated with an non-causal increase in reported life satisfac-
tion of 19% of a standard-deviation. An increase in the average income distance
to better-off others by EUR 1,000 decreases reported satisfaction by approximately
7% of a standard-deviation. Keeping everything else equal, this result suggests that
an increase in monthly income of the average individual by 100% does not change
perceived well-being, if at the same time the average distance to richer individuals’
monthly income increases by approximately EUR 2,500. The negative effect of ad-
vantageous income inequality is smaller but significant. An increase in the average
income distance to worse-off others by EUR 1,000 reduces satisfaction by approx-
imately 2% of a standard-deviation of self-reported life satisfaction. Therefore, a
100% increase in income does not change reported satisfaction, if at the same time
the average monthly income distance to poorer individuals increases by approxi-
mately EUR 11,000 –an unrealistically large amount given the average net deflated
income of about EUR 1,700. This suggests that individuals are on average averse
to disadvantageous and, to a lesser extend, advantageous income inequality. The
outcomes do not appear to be driven by estimation methodology. Compared to or-
dinary least squares, the results do not change substantially when ordered probit or
ordered logit estimators with fixed effects are employed.
Evidence from game-theoretic experiments suggests that there is considerable het-
erogeneity among attitudes towards payoff inequality. To account for some of this
heterogeneity, I estimate attitudes towards income inequality conditional on observ-
able characteristics such as age-cohort, gender, residency in the states of the former
GDR, and self-stated political conviction. Both relatively young and old individuals
are on average more averse to advantageous income inequality than the comparison
cohort. While both genders appear to be negatively affected by advantageous income
inequality, disadvantageous income inequality affects men more strongly. In all spec-
2
ifications, the results predict that Eastern Germans are on average more averse to
income inequality than Western Germans. Given the communist past of the former
GDR, this result supports the view that interdependent preferences are influenced
by societal norms. Consistent with these findings, politically left-leaning individuals
are more strongly affected by income inequality than rightists or centrists. On the
other hand, right-leaning individuals appear to have upward looking preferences in
that they are not affected by changes in the income distance to worse-off others.
A potential threat for the identification of interdependent preferences regarding
reference group income is related to the reflection problem of Manski (1993). The
problem arises if a researcher observing the distribution of behavior in a population
tries to infer whether the average behavior in some group influences the behavior of
the individuals within that group. Similar behavior within a group may be due to
the interaction of the group members (endogenous effect), driven by common exoge-
nous traits of the group members (exogenous effect), or due to common unobservable
characteristics or similar institutional environments (correlated effect). Attitudes to-
wards income inequality may be correlated with the specified reference groups. In
experimental studies, the reference group for each individual is generally assumed
to be other participants in the experiment. In household survey data the relevant
comparison group is unobserved. Obtaining reference groups from observed behavior
will make any social effects model hold tautologically. Therefore, I define reference
groups by observable demographic characteristics. Clark and Senik (2010) report
that incomes are most often compared to those of work colleagues, friends, and fam-
ily members. Following the comparison income literature, reference groups are based
on age-cohort, occupation type, educational attainment, gender, and cohabitation
with a life-partner. The results do not change qualitatively between reference group
specifications. Following Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014), for each individual the
respective reference group includes similar others not living in the same state (Bun-
desland) to control for correlated effects originating from institutional environments.
Furthermore, I include state-year interactions to control for time-varying regional
shocks. Similar to Maurer and Meier (2008), I account for exogenous effects by in-
cluding socio-demographic measures of the reference groups as additional regressors.
Last, reference group indicator variables are included alongside year and individual
fixed effects to capture stratification effects and unobserved heterogeneity.
The response rate for most variables is close to 100%. In the eleven years of
data, the majority of missing values stem from the dependent variable self-reported
3
happiness. Missing values, especially in the dependent variable could be a source
of inconsistency if the observations are not missing randomly. For example, one
can assume that respondents who are particularly unhappy about their income or
status in society would decide not to reveal their unhappiness out of shame or pride.
Indeed, for all years, the average income of respondents to the question on happiness
is significantly larger than the average income of non-respondents. In this case, a
negative effect of disadvantageous income inequality on self-reported happiness would
be underestimated in the empirical model. Ultimately, this data problem is beyond
the scope of this study.
This chapter is closely related to work of D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) and Cojo-
caru (2014). The first authors study the effects of changes in relative deprivation and
satisfaction on self-reported happiness in a dynamic framework using SOEP data.
They find that an individual’s happiness is affected negatively by the comparison
to richer others and affected positively by the comparison to those who are poorer.
Their estimates on income dynamics suggest the presence of newly richer and poorer
individuals plays the informational role described by the tunnel effect of Hirschman
(1973). My findings contradict their results –instead of spiteful preferences, I find
inequality aversion. The discrepancy in results is likely caused by differences in the
empirical model. The main difference is that D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) take the
entire sample population as the relevant reference group and hence do not include
socio-demographic aggregates to account for exogenous effects.
It could be argued that the relevant reference income distribution is best rep-
resented by including all incomes. A major drawback to this approach is that due
to exact collinearity, time effects can not be included in their specification to mit-
igate omitted variable bias from correlated effects3. Consequently, both aggregate
life satisfaction and income inequality may be affected by economic growth which
enters the error term. Furthermore, as Clark and Senik (2010) show, the relevant
comparison group likely depends on individual characteristics such as occupation,
age, education, and region of residency. By computing income inequality within ref-
erence groups defined by several individual specific characteristics, I extend existing
work on comparison income effects which generally employs only a single reference
group specification.
3D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) claim that they account for time effects but it is easy to see that
the measures of income and income disparity are linearly related to time fixed effects and hence
cannot be included in their empirical model.
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Cojocaru (2014) estimates a rearranged F&S model using data from the Life in
Transition survey and reference groups defined by geographic region. He finds that
individuals exhibit aversion to income inequality, a result that cannot be captured
by the Gini index. This finding is in line with my results. The Life in Transition
survey has broad geographic coverage including 27 countries, but does not contain
longitudinal data. Therefore, the results solely rely on variation between instead of
within individuals. With cross-sectional data, accounting for unobserved heterogene-
ity across reference groups by means of reference group fixed effects is not possible due
to exact collinearity. Therefore, the threat of omitted variable bias from correlated
or exogenous effects cannot be mitigated. Another potential problem in his analysis
is the small number of individuals per reference group. The size of the reference
group within a Census Enumeration Area is ranging between 14 to 25 observations.
As a robustness check, the author extends the regions accross which reference groups
are defined to include an average of 150 individuals per group. While the increased
number of observations allows for a more meaningful estimation of regional income
distributions, it comes at the cost of weakening the claim of observability which
underlies the concept of relative deprivation and relative satisfaction. Different to
Cojocaru (2014), my results rely on a longitudinal data set which contains approxi-
mately the same number of individuals per year as the Life in Transition survey as
a whole, while being geographically restricted to one country instead of 27.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The theoretical model
is described in Section 1.2. Rearranging the F&S model reveals that it nests the
comparison income model which allows for a simple statistical test of predictive power
between both models. Section 1.3, summarizes the empirical strategy and describes
the reference groups by which the inequality measures will be calculated. Section 1.4
briefly describes the data. The results are presented in Section 1.5. I demonstrate
that the F&S-model has significantly more predictive power than the simple relative
income model. Furthermore, it is inequality aversion that drives the comparison
income effect in most specifications. For many reference group specifications, the
results are robust to estimation methodology, relaxing the linearity assumption of




The utility function with interdependent preferences introduced by F&S to account
for deviations from game-theoretic predictions in experiments with N individuals
and without predefined reference groups is given by:










(xi − xj), (1.1)
where xi ≥ 0 is individual i’s payoff. The second term measures attitude towards
disadvantageous payoff inequality and the third term attitude towards advantageous
payoff inequality, both from the perspective of i. The parameters αi and βi define the
nature of individual i’s preferences. If αi = βi = 0, the utility specification reduces
to a linear function of own payoff without interdependent preferences. If αi < 0
and βi < 0, individual i is averse to payoff inequality4. An individual with spiteful
preferences can be modeled by setting αi < 0 < βi. This parameter relation would
imply that individual i is averse to disadvantageous payoff inequality but prefers a
growing payoff-distance to others poorer than her. Assume for the remainder of this
chapter that equation (1.1) not only applies to payoffs in experiments, but more
generally reflects attitudes towards income inequality with respect to a reference
group.
Define the inequality measures Di(x) = 1/(N − 1)
∑
xj>xi(xj − xi) and Si(x) =
1/(N − 1)∑xi>xj (xi − xj). For simplicity, F&S impose the assumption that payoff
inequality enters the utility function linearly. Using net deflated monthly income in-
stead of payments received in experiments, it could be argued that income differences
have a non-linear impact on perceived income inequality. For example in a society
with two individuals, if the wealth difference between the two doubles, it is possible
that the poorer individual perceives more, or less than twice the initial level of de-
privation. Let g+ and g− represent income-difference dependent weighting functions
on the inequality measures Di and Si respectively. The inequality measures linear in
income can be written as Di(x) = Di(x)g+0 and Si(x) = Si(x)g−0 for constant weights
g+0 = g−0 = 1. The weighting function g+1 (x) =
∑
xj>xi ln(xj − xi)/
∑
xj>xi(xj − xi),
decreasing in (xj − xi), is equivalent to using logarithmic income differences in the
calculation of the inequality measures. In effect, small income differences enter the
4For inequality averse preferences, F&S further impose the plausible condition that αi ≤ βi < 0
which implies that disadvantageous inequality affects utility at least as strongly as advantageous
inequality.
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utility function with a relatively larger weight. This specification imposes the as-
sumption that smaller income differences are more visible or important than larger
ones. This assumption is in line with the predictions from models of status competi-
tion where closer proximity of individuals in the status dimension increases wasteful
conspicuous consumption. The weighting function g+2 (x) =
∑
xj>xi(xj − xi), increas-
ing in (xj−xi), is equivalent to squaring the income differences and thereby imposes
the assumption that large income differences have a relatively stronger impact on
perceived inequality than smaller ones. It can be argued that large income differences
create a feeling of deprivation and skepticism regarding social mobility. On the other
side, those with very high incomes may feel guilt and concern about social cohesion.
Since it is not unequivocally clear which weighting function should be chosen for Di
and Si, I employ the two exemplary weighting functions in the empirical analysis
alongside the linear model to verify robustness.
Deaton (2003) shows for linear weights and continuous distributions5 of x that







xi − βiµi(x−i) + (αi + βi)Di(x). (1.2)
The measure of advantageous income inequality, Si(x), can be expressed by the
variables xi, Di(x), and µi(x−i) = 1/(N − 1)
∑
j 6=i xj. The latter variable represents
the average income of others (i.e. comparison income). It is a robust empirical finding
that self-reported happiness is decreasing in the income of similar others. Equation
(1.2) is important because it shows that the standard comparison income model is
nested in the F&S model. Assuming linearity, this allows to test and compare the
predictive power of both models.
In much of the empirical literature the negative relationship between comparison
income and happiness is taken as suggestive evidence of inequality averse preferences
(Clark et al., 2008). However, other types of interdependent preferences are coherent
with a negative comparison income effect. Suppose the average individual has spiteful
preferences in that she obtains utility not only from absolute income but also from
getting ahead of those with lower income and catching up with those who are richer.
A regression of self-reported happiness on income and comparison income would
yield a negative coefficient independent of changes in income inequality. To see this,
assume individuals have F&S-type preferences as represented in equation (1.2). For
5Appendix A shows the steps in the derivation for discrete distributions.
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simplicity, assume the preferences of the average person are either spiteful so that
αi < 0 < βi or inequality averse with αi < βi < 0. A researcher interested in the
effect of peer income µi(x−i) on happiness Ui specifies the simplified empirical model:
Ui = γ0 + γ1xi + γ2µi(x−i) + Ziζ + νi
νi = γ3Di(x) + εi ,
(1.3)
with control variables Zi where by assumption γ1 = 1 + β NN−1 , γ2 = −β and γ3 =
α + β. In other words, a reduced form of equation (1.2) is estimated with the
restriction α+ β = 0. In a special case of spiteful preferences such that α = −β, the
restriction may be fulfilled. In this case, γ2 will be negative since income gains of
others reduce utility. Assume now that the restriction is violated and individuals are
inequality averse. Then, γ2 is expected to be positive but may be affected by omitted
variable bias since Di(x), xi, and µ(x−i) are functionally related. Di(x) enters the
error term νi with a negative sign as long as α < β < 0. In Appendix A I show that
Cov[µi(x−i), Di(x)] > 0 for non-degenerate income distributions which implies larger
values of comparison income are associated with larger values for disadvantageous
inequality and vice versa.
Since Di(x) enters the error term with a negative sign, the coefficient on compar-
ison income would be downward biased and potentially negative even if the average
individual is averse to income inequality. Using panel instead of cross-sectional data
will not mitigate this bias. However, by allowing for F&S-type preferences instead
of imposing the restriction α + β = 0, it is possible to distinguish the underlying
type of interdependent preferences. Extending equation (1.3) to nest the F&S utility
framework gives:
Ui = γ0 + γ1xi + γ∗2µi(x−i) + γ3Di(x) + Ziζ + εi, (1.4)
where γ∗2 = −β. A t-test on γ3 allows to compare the predictive power of both
models if α 6= 0 and β 6= 0 do not sum to zero. Depending on the relative explanatory
power of comparison income alone and more general interdependent preferences, the
estimated parameters can be interpreted as described in Table 1.1.
A positive estimate of γ∗2 and γ3 implies selfless or altruistic preferences in the F&S
model where utility increases in the income distance to richer others decreases in the
income distance to poorer others. With observational data, it is more plausible that
peer group income changes contain information about own future advances. Positive
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Table 1.1: Implications of point estimates for underlying preferences.
γ3 > 0 γ3 < 0 γ3 = 0
γ∗2 > 0
altruistic preferences
(β < 0 < α)
inequality aversion
if |γ3| > |γ∗2 |
then α < β < 0
positive comparison
income effect

















estimates of γ∗2 and γ3 are therefore considered evidence in favor of the tunnel effect
(Hirschman, 1973). If γ3 = γ∗2 = 0, peer incomes do not affect utility. In column
(3), a positive comparison income effect may indicate either β < 0 and α = −β –a
special case of tunnel effect preferences, or that there is no differential effect of the
income distance to richer peers beyond the comparison income effect. A negative
comparison income effect on the other hand indicates spiteful preferences where α
and β sum to zero or that the F&S model is inferior to the reduced model. In both
cases, I regard γ3 = 0 as strong evidence in favor of the comparison income model.
In case γ3 6= 0 the sign and size of the theoretical parameters underlying the
coefficients informs about the type of preferences. For example, spiteful preferences
similar to Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) are evident if α < 0 < β. Some studies
find that comparisons are mostly upwards (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). If γ∗2 = 0, the
sign of γ3 allows to distinguish between the tunnel effect (α > 0) and upward-looking
comparisons (α < 0) as postulated by Duesenberry (1949). Last, γ∗2 > 0 and γ3 < 0
imply aversion to both advantageous and disadvantageous income inequality.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis will be based on a subjective self-reported measure of life sat-
isfaction obtained from individual responses to the following SOEP survey question:
”And finally, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with
your life in general. Please answer by using the following scale, in which
0 means totally unhappy, and 10 means totally happy. How happy are
you with your life as a whole?”
The answers to this question take on discrete values on a 11-point scale. Assume
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that (1) individuals are willing and able to answer, (2) the answers are a positive
monotonic transformation of the underlying metaphysical concept of utility, (3) the
answers are interpersonally cardinally comparable. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
(2004) find that assuming ordinal or cardinal comparability makes little difference as
long as individual-specific heterogeneity in responses is accounted for. This suggests
that Panel data and fixed effects models should be used. The preferred empirical
specification is an ordered latent response model that controls for time invariant
heterogeneity while not requiring cardinal comparability. Unfortunately due to the
incidental parameters problem, standard ordered probit and logit models with fixed
effects are biased with large N and small T . A feasible alternative is transforming
the happiness measure to a binary variable indicating responses above and below av-
erage and using probit fixed effects (Chamberlain, 1980). Since this model restricts
analysis to individuals who cross the cut-off, there is a large loss of data. Assuming
the correlation between time-invariant unobservables and the included regressors is
linear in the averages of the latter (Mundlak, 1978) this data loss can be prevented.
Alternatively, Baetschmann et al. (2015) propose an ordered logit fixed effects esti-
mator (BUC) which appears to be immune to small sample bias compared to other
consistent estimators. To ensure that the outcomes are not driven by imposing inter-
personal cardinal comparability, additionally to ordinary least squares, results from
the ordered probit and logit fixed effects estimators described above are reported.
Assume that for every individual with interdependent preferences the assessment
of personal advantageous and disadvantageous income inequality depends on how
her income compares to relevant others –her reference group. If reference groups are
endogenous, group affiliation likely depends on occupation and demographic charac-
teristics. According to Clark and Senik (2010), approximately 35% of respondents
to the European Social Survey stated that they do not compare their income to oth-
ers. Those who compare their income name work colleagues (56%), friends (23%),
family members (9%), and undefined others (12%) as their reference group. It can
be argued that individuals compare their own standing to a group similar to them,
a group they aspire to belong to in the future, their own income history, or a subset
of the entire society perceived as representative for the region or country. In the
empirical literature, reference groups are defined either across individuals who share
observable characteristics, within the same occupations, or by regions to capture the
regional specific income distribution observed by the individual.
A potential obstacle for the identification of interdependent preferences regarding
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peer income is related to the reflection problem of Manski (1993). The problem arises
if a researcher observing the distribution of behavior in a population tries to infer
whether the average behavior in some group influences the behavior of the individu-
als within that group. Similar behavior within a group may be due to the interaction
of the group members (endogenous effect), driven by common exogenous traits of the
group members (exogenous effect), or due to common unobservable characteristics or
similar institutional environments (correlated effect). My goal is to identify endoge-
nous effects of distributional changes on self-reported happiness. A source of bias
could be that individuals in certain occupations may be affected differently by the
incomes of their peers (exogenous effect), potentially due to differences in income
transparency. Alternatively, if groups are based on observable demographics such
as education, there is an exogenous effect if attitudes towards inequality vary with
the socio-economic composition of the reference group. Additionally, there may be
regional or institutional effects present that affect both self-reported happiness and
inequality measures. For example, economic growth may affect self-reported hap-
piness and incomes in a reference group in a non-linear way. To account for these
identification problems, I define four reference groups by socio-demographic char-
acteristics and compare results across specifications. Following Drechsel-Grau and
Schmid (2014), for each individual the reference groups include similar others not
living in the same state to control for correlated effects from institutional environ-
ments. Furthermore, state-year interactions are included to control for time-varying
regional shocks. Similar to Maurer and Meier (2008), exogenous effects are accounted
for by including socio-demographic measures of the reference groups as additional
regressors. More specifically, all of the socio-demographic control variables such as
age, years of education, number of children and adults in the household, are aggre-
gated by individual-specific reference group and included as further regressors. Last,
reference group indicator variables are included alongside year and individual fixed
effects.
Since SOEP survey respondents are not asked whom they compare to, the indi-
vidual specific reference group cannot be identified directly from the data. Further-
more, as shown by Manski (1995), obtaining reference groups from observed behavior
will make any social effects model hold by construction and thwart identification.
Therefore, informed specification of the relevant reference groups is required and will
be based on observable demographic characteristics. Specifically, reference groups
are defined according to (i) occupation-age-gender (ii) occupation-age-cohabitation,
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(iii) education-age-gender, and (iv) education-age-cohabitation. Co-workers are the
most frequently cited reference group. In specifications (i) and (ii) the measures of
income inequality are calculated by the ten major occupation groups specified by the
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)6. The age-cohorts are
defined by individuals being younger than 25, between 25 and 35, between 35 and
45, between 45 and 65, and over 65 years old at the time of the interview. Cohabita-
tion indicates whether the individual is living together with a life partner. The first
and second specification results in 100 separate reference groups. In specifications
(iii) and (iv), individuals are categorized into groups dependent on whether they re-
ported less than 10, 10, 11, 12, or more than 12 years of education7. Combined with
five age cohorts and gender or cohabitation, this results in a total of 50 reference
groups. When occupation is used as a stratifying variable, the sample is restricted
to employed individuals. If information on less than 100 individuals is available for
a given year from the sample, the respective reference group is omitted for that year
to achieve representative income distributions.
Instead of individual utility H∗, the discrete, ordered, categorical variable H is
observed. Assume the latent variable H∗ is related to income xit, the aggregate
income distance to others with higher and lower income in reference group p and a
vector of demographic control variables Z as described in the baseline model:







νit = ηi + πp + λt + statei × t+ εit,
(1.5)
where ηi and πp represent individual and group fixed effects respectively. Year effects
are captured by λt and statei × t indicate state-year interactions. The vector of
control variables Zjit contains age, age-squared, years of education, number of children
and adults living in the household, whether the individual is currently living with a
6ISCO groups occupations mainly on the basis of the similarity of skills required to fulfill the
tasks and duties of the jobs. The following 10 occupation types form reference groups: (1) legisla-
tors, senior officials and managers; (2) professionals; (3) technicians and associate professionals; (4)
clerks; (5) service workers and shop and market sales workers; (6) skilled agricultural and fishery
workers; (7) craft and related trades workers; (8) plant and machine operators and assemblers; (9)
elementary occupations; (10) armed forces.
7Less than 10 years of school implies that the highest possible degree obtained is a Hauptschula-
bschluss. 10 and 11 years of schooling are required to achieve a Realschulabschluss. After 12 years
of school, the Abitur can be achieved, which enables enrollment for tertiary education.
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partner, employment status, number of interviews8, and an indicator variable for
windfall profits. K−i,jt contains the control variables specified in Zjit aggregated
at the reference group level. Dipt(x) and Sipt(x) are calculated with respect to i’s
exogenously defined reference group p. In some specifications, non-linear income
difference dependent weights will be applied to the inequality measures.
Identification requires either within-reference-group variation of income or between-
reference-group variation of mean income. Between variation implies that the within
reference group income distribution is different to the population income distribution
for some p to avoid exact collinearity. This condition is generally fulfilled for ref-
erence groups defined according to similar occupation, age-cohort, education level,
gender, and, cohabitation. Within group variation of income implies that despite
sharing similar characteristics, individuals in the same reference group have different
incomes so that the measures of income inequality are non-zero.
The special case of the rearranged F&S model with linear weighting functions
will be used for testing the comparison income effect:







νit = ηi + πp + λt + statei × t+ εit,
(1.6)
where the parameter estimates can be interpreted as described in Table 1.1. Model
(1.5) is used instead of (1.6) to assess attitudes to income inequality for three rea-
sons. First, model (1.5) allows for non-linear weighting functions. Second, attitudes
towards income inequality may differ across individuals. Model (1.5) is better suited
to test for differential effects of income inequality since the parameters of interest are
estimated separately. Third, for some parameter values, the underlying preferences
are unidentified in the rearranged model.
1.4 Data
I use household survey data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) to dis-
entangle the preferences underlying the comparison income effect. Of all household
surveys, the SOEP contains the longest series of happiness data and a large number
of individuals. The populations in East and West Germany likely differ in attitudes
8Landua (1992) finds that experienced survey participants tend to avoid extreme answers.
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towards income inequality due to their separate history. Individuals who grew up
and live in the formerly communist GDR may be affected more strongly by income
inequality in the society than those who experienced the social market economy.
Nevertheless, the East Germany subsample is included together with the sample of
West Germans in the regression and differences between east and west are accounted
for by interaction terms. Data on income and happiness is available for the years
1984 until 2012 for West Germany and from 1990 to 2012 for East Germany. To
compromise between avoiding spillovers from the German reunification in 1990 while
having a rich data set, the analysis will be restricted to the years from 2002 to 2012
and to all individuals with German nationality. The main reason to choose this
period is that it allows to include a subsample of high income households, added in
2002, to improve representativeness of the reference group income distributions.
The response rate for most variables is close to 100%. In the eleven years of
data, the majority of missing values stem from overall happiness (25.5%) and years
of education (27.0%). These values are stable over years and across subsamples.
Missing values, especially in the dependent variable could be a source of inconsistency
if the observations are not missing randomly. For overall happiness for example, one
can assume that respondents who are particularly unhappy about their income or
status in society would decide not to respond to this question. Indeed, a t-test for
mean difference strongly rejects that the sample income averages of respondents and
non-respondents to the happiness question are identical. For all years, the average
income of respondents to the question on happiness is significantly larger than the
average income of non-respondents. Ultimately, this data problem is beyond the
scope of this study.
The self-centered payoff inequality measures are computed from deflated monthly
net household income. To adjust for family size, income is divided by the square root
of the number of household members. The analysis is conducted at the individual
level. The measures for advantageous and disadvantageous inequality are calculated
with respect to members in the four reference groups. The summary statistics for
the inequality measures for all reference groups and with linear weighting functions
are reported in Table 1.2. The data contains information on 34,380 individuals
over on average 5.6 years, yielding a total of 192,669 observations. Approximately
47.7% of the sample population is male, 26.2% are residing in the states of the
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former GDR, and 60.6% are employed9. The binary control variable Interviews
indicates experienced survey respondents who where interviewed at least three times.
Cohabitation indicates if the person is currently living with his or her life partner.
The variables Adults and Children denote respectively the number of adults and
children living in the household. Education measures the years of completed primary,
secondary, and tertiary education. The average respondent is 50 years old.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Disadvantageous income inequality
Occupation-age-gender 0.468 0.377 79,384
Occupation-age-cohabitation 0.463 0.375 78,737
Education-age-gender 0.451 0.357 192,230
Education-age-cohabitation 0.445 0.352 191,430
Advantageous income inequality
Occupation-age-gender 0.638 1.247 79,384
Occupation-age-cohabitation 0.632 1.235 78,737
Education-age-gender 0.616 1.23 192,230
Education-age-cohabitation 0.61 1.226 191,430
Life satisfaction 6.973 1.769 192,669
Monthly income (TEUR) 1.776 1.289 192,669
Age 50.224 17.039 192,669
Education (years) 12.303 2.69 192,669
Children 0.458 0.843 192,669
Adults 2.14 0.832 192,669
Cohabitation 0.716 0.451 192,669
Interviews 0.875 0.331 192,669
Employed 0.606 0.489 192,669
Easterner 0.262 0.44 192,669
Male 0.477 0.499 192,669
Political conviction 4.784 1.545 192,669
Reference groups by occupation include only individuals in full-time employment. In-
come and inequality measures in EUR 1,000. Satisfaction with life in general at the time
of the survey for all individuals in the household 16 years of age and older. 0 means
completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied. Children denotes no. of chil-
dren living in the household. Adults denotes no. of adults in the household. Interviews
is a binary variable equal one if the person was interviewed for the third time. Political
conviction is self-rated political conviction on a scale from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme
right). Source: SOEP, v29.
9Only employed individuals are included in the reference group specification based on occupa-
tion. Furthermore, reference groups with fewer than 100 observations per year are dropped in the
respective year, hence the discrepancy in the number of observations.
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1.5 Results
A natural starting point to analyzing the relationship between peer income and hap-
piness is to show that the comparison income effect persists even when endogenous
and correlated effects are accounted for. To this end, I regress the average income
of similar others not living in the same state (together with individual- and peer-
demographic control variables and fixed effects) on self-reported happiness. The
point estimates summarized in panel A of Table 1.3 indicate a negative and signif-
icant effect of average peer income on self-reported happiness for all four reference
group specifications. This relationship is more pronounced when comparisons are
assumed to take place among individuals with the same cohabitation status than
the same gender. Restricting the sample to employed individuals, and defining ref-
erence groups according to occupation type instead of education affects the point
estimates only slightly. These results are in line with most of the comparison income
literature10.
The performance of the parsimonious model can be compared to the rearranged
F&S model by adding the average income distance to richer peers as a regressor.
The simple model is preferable if the additional variable does not add information to
predict self-reported life satisfaction. Panel B summarizes the point estimates of the
extended model. For all reference group specifications, the coefficients of Dipt(xt) are
highly significant and negative. Moreover, the adjusted coefficients of determination
are larger in the extended model. This implies that the F&S model has significantly
better predictive power. The coefficients on peer income are significantly positive for
all but the second reference group specification. In the extended model the coefficient
on µi(x−it) represents the sign-reversed coefficient on advantageous inequality β. A
positive significant coefficient on µi(x−it) therefore implies aversion to advantageous
income inequality. Together with the negative coefficient on Dipt(xt), the evidence
from specifications (i), (iii), and (iv) suggests that the average survey participant has
inequality averse preferences with α < β < 0. Different to panel A, the coefficient on
individual income in panel B is smaller and not significantly different from zero in all
specifications. Although no causal relationship exists in either case, equation (1.2)
states that the coefficient on income in the rearranged F&S model is increasing in β.
10Typically, individual and peer income is log-transformed to account for decreasing marginal
utility. The linearity assumption does not qualitatively alter the results and is imposed in Table 1.3
to facilitate nested hypothesis testing.
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Table 1.3: Comparison income effect and rearranged F&S model.
Happiness (0-10) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A - Reduced model
Income 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.047*** 0.046***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Comparison income -0.147** -0.228*** -0.192*** -0.227***
(0.066) (0.079) (0.069) (0.070)
R̄2 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012
Panel B - Extended model
Income 0.007 0.009 -0.002 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Comparison income 0.203*** 0.123 0.172** 0.142**
(0.074) (0.085) (0.072) (0.072)
Disadvantageous inequality -0.438*** -0.418*** -0.488*** -0.477***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026)
R̄2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79,384 78,737 192,230 191,430
Individuals 18,831 18,806 34,380 34,264
OLS-regression. Standard Errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *Significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Inequality measures calculated w.r.t. Occupation-
age-gender (i), Occupation-age-cohabitation (ii), Education-age-gender (iii), and Education-
age-cohabitation (iv). Control variables: age, age2, years of education, no. of children, no. of
adults, cohabitation, no. of interviews, employment status, region of residence and reference
group aggregates of the aforementioned. Source: SOEP v29.
The results from Table 1.3 support the predictive power of the F&S utility frame-
work and suggest inequality averse preferences of the average individual for most
specifications. It remains to be shown that these outcomes are not an artifact of
the linearity assumptions imposed on the inequality measures, not driven by the as-
sumption of interpersonal cardinal comparability of utility implied by ordinary least
squares estimation, and robust for subsets of the population. The results from esti-
mating the F&S model as outlined in equation (1.5) with three different weighting
functions are summarized Table 1.4. Compared to the rearranged model, the effect
of both inequality measures weakens when logarithmic income is used as a control
variable. In line with the previous table, panel A suggests inequality averse prefer-
ences for the average person for all reference groups, albeit β is considerably smaller
in magnitude. The impact of changing the functional form of the inequality measures
is exemplified in panel B and C. When small income differences receive a relatively
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larger weight, the relative size of α and β changes. Upward looking preferences
prevail when large income differences are assumed to be more relevant. However,
relative to panel A and B, the adjusted coefficient of determination in panel C is
smaller.
Table 1.4: Estimating interdependent preferences.
Happiness (0-10) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A - Linear income differences
ln(income) 0.328*** 0.299*** 0.187*** 0.194***
(0.053) (0.057) (0.040) (0.039)
Advantageous inequality -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Disadvantageous inequality -0.130** -0.157*** -0.251*** -0.239***
(0.051) (0.055) (0.051) (0.049)
Panel B - Logarithmic income differences
ln(income) 0.328*** 0.339*** 0.302*** 0.278***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.040) (0.039)
Advantageous inequality† -0.114*** -0.090*** -0.109*** -0.106***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
Disadvantageous inequality† -0.094*** -0.076*** -0.096*** -0.086***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Panel C - Quadratic income differences
ln(income) 0.376*** 0.361*** 0.318*** 0.313***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017)
Advantageous inequality‡ -0.191 -0.729* 0.005 -0.252
(0.318) (0.379) (0.196) (0.229)
Disadvantageous inequality‡ -0.086*** -0.082** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.004) (0.004)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79,384 78,737 192,230 191,430
Individuals 18,831 18,806 34,380 34,264
OLS-regression. Standard Errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *Significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Inequality measures calculated w.r.t. Occupation-
age-gender (1), Occupation-age-cohabitation (2), Education-age-gender (3), and Education-
age-cohabitation (4). †: The weighting functions g+1 (xt) and g
−
1 (xt) are applied to the in-
equality measures and assign weights decreasing in the income differences. ‡: The weighting
functions g+2 (xt) and g
−
2 (xt) are applied to the inequality measures and assign weights in-
creasing in the income differences. Control variables: age, age2, years of education, no. of
children, no. of adults, cohabitation, no. of interviews, employment status, region of residence
and reference group aggregates of the aforementioned. Quadratic weighting function scaled by
106. Source: SOEP v29.
Consider specification (i) of panel A in Table 1.4. Everything else being equal,
a 100% raise in net real monthly income is associated with an increase in reported
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satisfaction by 0.33 points for the average individual or 19% of a standard-deviation
of self-reported happiness. An increase in the average income distance to better-off
others by EUR 1,000 decreases reported satisfaction by approximately 0.13 points
or 7% of a standard-deviation. Keeping everything else equal, this suggests that an
increase in monthly income of the average individual by 100% is predicted to not
change perceived well-being, if at the same time the average distance to richer indi-
viduals increases by approximately EUR 2,500. The negative effect of advantageous
income inequality is smaller. An increase in the average income distance to worse-off
others by EUR 1,000 reduces satisfaction by approximately 0.03 points or 2% of a
standard-deviation. A 100% increase in income does not change satisfaction, if at
the same time the average distance to poorer individuals increases by approximately
EUR 11.000. At best, these coefficients reflect the attitudes towards income inequal-
ity of the average native German in the period under consideration11. Experimental
evidence suggests that there is considerable heterogeneity among attitudes towards
payoff inequality. F&S propose a simple discrete distribution of α and β consistent
with the large experimental evidence on the ultimatum game. Their distributional
assumptions imply population averages for α and β of 0.5 and 0.3 respectively. Nor-
malizing the coefficient on logarithmic income in specification (iii), the estimated
population averages of α and β are 0.4× 10−3 and 0.09× 10−3 respectively and thus
of similar relative size but smaller in absolute magnitude.
By comparison, Cojocaru (2014) finds that a one standard-deviation increase in
both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality is associated with a 1.9% reduc-
tion in the probability of reporting above-average life satisfaction. Considering the
point estimates reported in column (i), a one standard-deviation change in inequality
reduces self-reported life satisfaction by about 0.04 points or about 2% of a standard
deviation. D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) use annual instead of monthly income and
include the levels instead of logarithms in the model. Their coefficient on disadvan-
tageous inequality in absolute value is about four times as large as the coefficient
they report for advantageous inequality. Different to my results, they find that life
satisfaction is increasing in the income distance to poorer others.
Ordinary least squares estimation imposes the assumption that self-reported hap-
piness measures are cardinally comparable between individuals. Although empirical
evidence suggests that this assumption is fulfilled (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters,
11Non-reported estimations suggest that the coefficients remain stable when the sample period
is extended to include years 1994-2012.
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2004), latent variable models such as ordered probit with pseudo fixed effects and
the BUC ordered logit estimator do not require this assumption and still account for
unobserved heterogeneity. Estimates of the key parameters are reported in panel A
and B of Table 1.5. Using ordered probit, the point estimates become more similar
across reference groups. With BUC, inequality averse preferences prevail for specifi-
cations (ii)-(iv) only at 10% significance. As above, comparisons appear to be mostly
upwards.
Table 1.5: Latent variable models and curvature.
Happiness (0-10) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A - Ordered Probit†
Advantageous inequality -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Disadvantageous inequality -0.133*** -0.161*** -0.181*** -0.177***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036)
Panel B - Blow-Up and Cluster
Advantageous inequality -0.056*** -0.036** -0.020* -0.020*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011)
Disadvantageous inequality -0.052 -0.321*** -0.461*** -0.474***
(0.080) (0.101) (0.090) (0.079)
Panel C - Taylor Expansion‡
Advantageous inequality -0.569*** -0.475*** -0.272*** -0.292***
(0.161) (0.168) (0.085) (0.085)
(Advantageous inequality)2 0.087** 0.065 0.016** 0.018***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.006) (0.006)
Disadvantageous inequality -0.427 -0.053 -0.500 -0.889
(0.883) (0.917) (0.799) (0.770)
(Disadvantageous inequality)2 -3.065 -6.434* -9.423*** -6.714**
(3.713) (3.666) (3.448) (3.314)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79,384 78,737 192,230 191,430
Individuals 18,831 18,806 34,380 34,264
OLS-regression. Standard Errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *Significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. †: Individual FE are replaced with Mundlak (1978)
pseudo FE. ‡: monthly income in 10,000 EUR used for computation. Inequality measures calcu-
lated w.r.t. Occupation-age-gender (i), Occupation-age-cohabitation (ii), Education-age-gender
(iii), and Education-age-cohabitation (iv). Control variables: age, age2, years of education, no.
of children, no. of adults, cohabitation, no. of interviews, employment status, region of residence
and reference group aggregates of the aforementioned. Source: SOEP v29.
Convex preferences imply quasi-concavity of the utility function. To analyze
the curvature of the utility framework with interdependent preferences, the linear-
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ity assumption can be replaced by additive separability such that Uipt = ζ(zit) +
l(Dipt(xpt)) + m(Sipt(xpt)), where zit includes income. Assuming that utility is at
least twice differentiable and continuous in the inequality measures, this allows to
approximate the curvature by extending the baseline model to include the squares of
D and S. The results reported in panel C indicate that utility appears to be concave
in D and convex in S around the sample average. Figure 1.1 visualizes this result.
The relationship between advantageous income inequality and happiness appears to
be well approximated by a function linear in the income differences as in panel A of
Table 1.3.
A method to account for some of the heterogeneity in preferences is to estimate
attitudes towards income inequality conditional on observable characteristics such as
gender or age-cohort. Panel A of Table 1.6 shows the differences in attitudes towards
inequality between men and women. While both genders across all specifications are
on average negatively affected by advantageous income inequality, disadvantageous
inequality affects men more strongly with reference groups by education. This is
especially the case in specification (iii), which imposes the assumption that compar-
isons take place within gender. Panel B shows interactions of the inequality measures
with indicator variables for young (younger than 35 years) and old (older than 46).
Both relatively young and old individuals are on average more averse to advanta-
geous income inequality than the comparison cohort. The effect of disadvantageous
inequality however is not significantly different.
Alternatively, attitudes towards inequality can be estimated separately for East
and West Germans or by political conviction. Panel A of Table 1.7 shows the dif-
ferences in interdependent preferences between East and West Germans. In all
specifications, the results predict that East Germans are on average more averse
to (disadvantageous) income inequality than West Germans. This result implies
that interdependent preferences are subject to societal influence and not inherent
human characteristics. In 2005 and 2009 respondents to the SOEP questionnaire
were asked to state their political conviction on a scale from 0 to 10. The former
indicates that the individual identifies herself as a leftist and the latter that she iden-
tifies as a rightist. Assuming that political conviction is somewhat time invariant,
I classify a respondent as a leftist if the average response from both years is three
or lower. Likewise, an individual is classified as a rightist if the average response
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from both years is seven or higher, and a centrist otherwise12. Panel B summarizes
the differential effect of political conviction on attitudes to income inequality. Both
leftists and centrists are averse to income inequality. Although the point estimates
are negative, there is no significant differential effect for leftists when the sample is
restricted to employed individuals. Rightists on the other hand have upward look-
ing preferences and are only affected by disadvantageous income inequality. In all
specifications, the coefficients on advantageous inequality are jointly insignificant.
Table 1.6: Heterogeneity. Gender and Age.
Happiness (0-10) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A - Gender
Advantageous inequality -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.015** -0.016**
Disadvantageous inequality -0.094 -0.159** -0.149** -0.183***
Advantageous inequality × Male 0.024 0.030** -0.003 0.001
Disadvantageous inequality × Male -0.043 0.013 -0.168*** -0.106**
Panel B - Age
Advantageous inequality × Young -0.072** -0.058** -0.034* -0.031*
Disadvantageous inequality × Young -0.034 0.012 0.061 0.086
Advantageous inequality -0.005 -0.009 0.005 0.006
Disadvantageous inequality -0.134* -0.131* -0.316*** -0.285***
Advantageous inequality × Old -0.028* -0.025* -0.021* -0.023*
Disadvantageous inequality × Old 0.016 -0.026 0.070 0.043
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79,384 78,737 192,230 191,430
Individuals 18,831 18,806 34,380 34,264
OLS-regression. Standard Errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **sig-
nificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Inequality measures calculated w.r.t. Occupation-age-gender (i),
Occupation-age-cohabitation (ii), Education-age-gender (iii), and Education-age-cohabitation (iv). Con-
trol variables: age, age2, years of education, no. of children, no. of adults, cohabitation, no. of interviews,
employment status, region of residence and reference group aggregates of the aforementioned. Source:
SOEP v29.
12Approximately 12% of the individuals in the sample are classified as rightists and 16% as
leftists.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneity. Region and Political Conviction.
Happiness (0-10) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A - Eastern Germany
Advantageous inequality -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.015***
Disadvantageous inequality -0.078 -0.104* -0.160*** -0.153***
Advantageous inequality × East -0.025 -0.009 -0.078*** -0.067**
Disadvantageous inequality × East -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.222*** -0.201***
Panel B - Political Conviction
Advantageous inequality × Leftist -0.014 -0.007 -0.037** -0.036**
Disadvantageous inequality × Leftist -0.103 -0.091 -0.027 -0.016
Advantageous inequality -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.016** -0.018**
Disadvantageous inequality -0.091* -0.126** -0.239*** -0.235***
Advantageous inequality × Rightist 0.033* 0.043** 0.007 0.010
Disadvantageous inequality × Rightist -0.128* -0.064 -0.014 0.041
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79,384 78,737 192,230 191,430
Individuals 18,831 18,806 34,380 34,264
OLS-regression. Standard Errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Inequality measures calculated w.r.t. Occupation-age-gender (i), Occupation-
age-cohabitation (ii), Education-age-gender (iii), and Education-age-cohabitation (iv). Control variables:
age, age2, years of education, no. of children, no. of adults, cohabitation, no. of interviews, employment
status, region of residence and reference group aggregates of the aforementioned. Source: SOEP v29.
1.6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper introduces an empirical test for the predictive power of the comparison in-
come model against a more general model of interdependent preferences. The results
indicate that for all reference group specifications the F&S-type utility framework
is better suited for predicting happiness scores than the simple comparison income
model. The negative coefficient on average reference group income appears to be
driven by aversion to income inequality rather than altruistic or spiteful preferences.
The results are consistent across reference group specifications and for constant and
logarithmic weighting functions. I focus on estimating the attitude towards income
inequality of the average person and the relative predictive power of comparison in-
come. It is likely that there exists strong heterogeneity among individuals when it
comes to attitude towards inequality. A majority of individuals may be unaffected
or even positively affected by income inequality. The results indicate significant gen-
der difference in that men appear to be more strongly affected by disadvantageous
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income inequality. Also, relative to individuals between 35 and 45 years of age,
both younger and older cohorts appear to be more affected by advantageous income
inequality, presumably for different reasons. Individuals living in the states of the
former GDR appear to be more averse to income inequality than those in West Ger-
many, which confirms the strong effect of cultural background on norms, even more
than twenty years after the German reunification. Consistent with this result, cen-
trists and left-leaning individuals show inequality averse preferences. Right-leaning
individuals on the other hand have upward looking preferences and are only affected
by disadvantageous income inequality.
The comparisons are mostly upwards in that individuals are on average more
affected by disadvantageous than advantageous income inequality. Normalizing the
coefficient on income to one, the coefficients on both inequality measures with linear
weighting functions are much smaller than predicted by game-theoretic experiments
but the relative size is similar. The results do not appear to be an artifact of the im-
posed functional form of utility. F&S-type interdependent preferences impose strong
assumptions on the utility function, and, when used with empirical data, on the per-
ception of inequality in the society. If one is reluctant to attribute attitudes towards
income inequality to the point estimates, the statistical significance of the average in-
come distance to better-off others indicates a differential effect of comparison income
on self-reported happiness. Nevertheless, the results suggest that F&S-type inter-
dependent preferences account better for attitude of the average individual towards
income of others than peer income alone.
Compared to Cojocaru (2014) and D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) my results fall
somewhat in the middle. Similar to Cojocaru (2014) I find on average inequal-
ity averse preferences. While his analysis using data from 27 transition economies
suggests approximately the same effect size for advantageous and disadvantageous
income inequality on individual happiness, my results using SOEP data indicate that
aversion to advantageous income inequality is economically insignificant. D’Ambrosio
and Frick (2012) on the other hand report spiteful instead of inequality averse pref-
erences using an earlier version of the same data set. The authors neither define
reference groups nor include time fixed effects in their model. Similar to my results,
the effect of disadvantageous inequality affects happiness more strongly than the
effect of advantageous inequality.
Despite the robustness across various alternative model specifications, sources of
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inconsistency remain. The defined reference groups might insufficiently approximate
the income distribution relevant for individual comparison. Although the reflection
problem may be mitigated by restricting reference groups to individuals from other
states, including socio-demographic characteristics of peers, and reference group fixed
effects, it is unknown to what extend exogenous and correlated effects still bias the
results. Also, it is unknown to which degree individuals perceive their own relative
position in the reference group income distribution. Experimental evidence suggests
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the population regarding interdependent
preferences. This study confirms that the estimated coefficients for the average
individual are relatively stable for subsamples by gender, residency in the states of
the former GDR, and age-cohort. In future research, random coefficient models could
be employed to estimate the distribution of α and β in the population.
The analysis in this chapter shows that, ceteris paribus, self-reported happiness
decreases in disadvantageous, and, to a lesser extent, advantageous income inequality
when reference groups are defined by demographic characteristics. Most economists
agree that due to the effect on incentives, neither the absence nor extreme levels of
income inequality maximize economic growth. A social planner whose objective is to
maximize aggregate life satisfaction might be tempted to reduce income inequality
either for the entire society or within professions. While such policies may cause
individuals with relatively low income to evaluate their lifetime achievements and
social status more positively, reduced incentives for high income earners may create
more harm than good for the economy overall. Given the interdependencies between
income inequality and economic growth, and the contributions of the latter to job
security, income growth, and social cohesion – all determinants of life satisfaction,
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Chapter 2
Rural Banks and Agricultural
Production: Evidence from India’s
Social Banking Experiment
2.1 Introduction
Improving access to formal banking and financial services has long been seen as a key
tool to reducing poverty in developing countries (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee
and Newman, 1993). Indeed, recent empirical research has shown its effectiveness
in this regard, including in India (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Fulford, 2013; Kochar,
2011). Despite this, we know relatively little about the underlying pathways through
which access to banks can lead to reductions in poverty. In this study, we use district-
level panel data to study India’s government-led rural banking program in the 1980s
to shed light on these potential pathways, focusing on agricultural production.
Access to banking services has the potential to increase agricultural productivity,
and thereby rural incomes, via three leading pathways. First, such services may help
individual farmers to overcome liquidity constraints, which can cause under-usage
of inputs. We investigate this by analyzing the impact of bank growth on agricul-
tural yields, as well as the use of inputs including land, irrigation, seeds, fertilizers
and machinery. Second, bank credit can help improve intertemporal consumption
smoothing, and therefore increase farmers’ willingness to engage in riskier but more
profitable activities. We assess this potential channel by considering changes in
crop portfolio over time in response to bank growth, specifically shifts towards more
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volatile but higher return crops. Third, banks can provide some insurance against
adverse weather shocks. To test for this, we examine whether banks attenuate the
relationship between lagged rainfall and contemporaneous production.
Our results show that improved access to banks did significantly increase agri-
cultural yields and production. Specifically, a 1% growth in banks is associated with
a 0.4% growth in yields. To decompose this relationship further, we document an
increase in the use of relatively more expensive but higher-yielding variety (HYV)
seeds for cereal cultivation. Moreover, bank growth appears to shift the overall port-
folio towards more cash crops and double-cropping during the winter season. Finally,
we find banks had an attenuating influence on the negative effects of lagged rainfall
shocks through changes in the use of irrigation resources.
Evaluating the causal impacts of formal banking services on agricultural produc-
tion in a non-experimental setting is challenging. For instance, banks may choose
to open new branches in the most productive regions at baseline, but lower growth
potential, leading OLS to underestimate the true effects. In contrast, banks may
choose to open new branches in regions with lower baseline productivity, but higher
growth potential, leading OLS to overestimate the true effects. In order to address
these potential biases, we exploit a series of central-government regulations, aimed
explicitly at expanding the rural banking infrastructure in India during the 1980s,
to generate a time-varying instrument for bank growth at the district level.
From 1978 to 1990, three consecutive periods of Branch Licensing Policies (BLPs)
guided the spread of banking infrastructure in India. Instigated to ensure a more
equitable distribution of banking facilities across the country, the BLPs regulated
the location of new branches towards unbanked regions. Using a target population-
per-branch ratio (set to the national average at the onset of each period), a district
was identified as deficit if found to be above the stipulated threshold. If classified
as such, the district was assigned a detailed branch expansion program. Compliance
was monitored at the end of each period, when districts were reclassified based on
their updated population-per-branch ratio.
Our identification strategy leverages the fact that the same district can be deficit
in one period, and not so in another. Such policy-induced changes in bank growth
within a district over time allows us to estimate more accurately the causal im-
pacts of this major expansion in banking infrastructure in 20th century India. To
test the validity of this empirical strategy more formally, we carry out a number
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of placebo tests that show the instrument to be uncorrelated with potentially con-
founding factors such as growths in physical infrastructure (namely road networks),
market development, other government policies such as preferential lending to agri-
culture. Furthermore, we show that the instrument is uncorrelated with pre-trends
in our outcomes.
Our unit of analysis is a district-BLP period, the same as that used to plan and
implement the rural banking program. Spanning the decade covered under the three
BLP periods, 1978-1988, our panel includes a total of 218 districts across 15 states.
We digitize the number of rural banks for each district-year, using the Reserve Bank
of India’s (RBI) Basic Statistical Reports (BSRs). Data on agricultural inputs and
production indicators over the same period are obtained from the Village Dynamics
in South Asia Macro-Meso Database (VDSA).
This study is related to several strands of literature. First, a number of pa-
pers have documented the poverty-reducing effects of India’s social banking program
(Burgess and Pande, 2005; Fulford, 2013; Kochar, 2011). Specifically, Burgess and
Pande (2005) report that the growth in banking infrastructure can account for up
to 15% of the reduction in the head count ratio during the 1970s and 80s. Our
study adds to this literature by identifying the underlying pathways for the effect on
poverty, examining responses in a detailed set of agricultural production choices to
bank branch growth.
While the policy evaluated in this chapter is specific to India and dates back to
the 1980s, the fundamental question of assessing the impact from access to banking
services has received renewed attention recently (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). Ex-
perimental evidence testing the impact of expanding access to basic bank accounts
across three countries by Dupas et al. (2018) find large effects on savings rate among
users. However, the authors do not detect any sizable intention-to-treat effects on
the study population, suggesting that access alone may not lead to notable improve-
ments on average.
Our study also contributes to the literature on agricultural technology adoption.
Previous research has examined numerous barriers, including lack of learning (Con-
ley and Udry, 2010; Hanna et al., 2014), access to markets (Ashraf et al., 2009), high
transaction costs (Suri, 2011), time-inconsistent preferences (Duflo et al., 2011), as
well as liquidity constraints (Beaman et al., 2014; Karlan et al., 2014). Much of the
recent work has come from randomized control trials. This chapter provides comple-
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mentary insight by examining in detail the impacts of a major policy-led expansion
in rural banking infrastructure from a highly important developing country.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a historical
overview of formal banking in India. Section 2.3 describes the data and Section 2.4
the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 reports results on agricultural output, inputs,
and crop choice, as well as the interacting effect of bank growth with lagged rainfall.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Social Banking in India
Despite some initial regulation by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) encouraging the
spread of banking infrastructure by commercial banks during the early 1960s, the
foundation stone for a nationwide social banking program occurred in 1969 with
the government seizing ‘social control’ of 14 commercial banks (Panagariya 2006). A
second nationalization phase in 1980 of an additional 6 banks, brought approximately
91% of banking business in India under central governance. The Preamble to the
Banking Companies Act of 1980 transferring the undertaking of these 6 private banks
clearly sets the intention of the Government at the time:
“An Act to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the undertak-
ings, in order further to control the heights of the economy, to meet pro-
gressively, and serve better, the needs of the development of the economy
and to promote the welfare of the people, in conformity with the policy of
the State.”
The following decade (1980-1990) witnessed the amplification of financial services at
the core of the central government anti-poverty campaign via three leading policies:
bank branch licensing, priority sector lending, and subsidized credit.
Branch Licensing Policies (BLPs) were instigated to ensure an equitable distribu-
tion of banking facilities across the country1. The 1980s witnessed three consecutive
BLP periods, which saw the national number of rural bank branches increase by
1BLPs were first introduced in 1962, stipulating that commercial banks should open branches
in a ratio of 1:2 between banked and unbanked locations. This ratio later changed to 1:1 in 1968.
In 1977, the ‘entitlement formula’ was introduced which required banks to open a minimum of four
branches in rural and semi-urban locations for every branch opened in an urban center. This ratio
applied only to banks with less than 60% of their offices in rural and semi-urban areas. Banks
satisfying the threshold only had to abide to a ratio of 1:2 new bank branches in urban and rural
areas respectively.
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approximately 15,000 (see panel A of Figure 2.1). The policies employed a target
population to bank branch ratio in order to identify districts as deficit in finance.
The first BLP period (BLP-1; 1979-1982) was implemented on a target of 20,000 peo-
ple per rural bank branch, which was revised down to 17,000 for the second (BLP-2;
1982-1985) and third (BLP-3; 1985-1990)2 BLP periods3. The ratio, stipulated based
on the national average at the onset of the period, was calculated on the basis of
the 1981 India census population in all cases and the updated number of banks at
the onset of the specific BLP period. Districts whose existing number of rural banks
generated a ratio above the specified threshold were classified as deficit and conse-
quently assigned to a detailed branch expansion program by the RBI. Compliance
to the policy guidelines was monitored at the end of each BLP period by State gov-
ernments. Districts were reclassified according to their updated information. We
exploit this reclassification in deficit status to generate a time-varying instrument
for bank growth at the district level.
Alongside improved access to banking services, the 1980s witnessed a surge in
the amount of finance disbursed to farmers. As shown in panel B of Figure 2.1, the
average loan size per farm rose from approximately 700 Rupees in 1978 to over 2,000
Rupees by 1990. This period of change within the rural banking sector, appears to be
matched by considerable improvements in the agricultural sector. As can be observed
in panel A of Figure 2.2, total annual production increased by over 200 billion Rupees
from 1978 to 1990. This rise in output does not appear to be driven by increased
land area allocated to agricultural use, but rather a shift towards intensification of
practices by adopting high-yielding varieties (see panel B of Figure 2.2). As a preview
to our results, bank branch growth appears to have significantly relaxed some of the
liquidity constraints faced by farmers and encouraged adoption of new inputs such
as improved seeds. However, the extent of financial services received is unlikely to
have been consequential enough for larger investments such as machinery (as a note
2In 1989, the emphasis started to shift from overt expansion to ensuring the viability of bank
business in remote rural areas. A Service Area Approach (SAA) was therefore introduced to the
BLP regulations of that period, such that a block of 15 to 25 villages were assigned to a specific
bank. According to this new rule, branch construction was to be guided by both a target ratio of
villages per bank in addition to the target population per bank ratio. Since we do not have access
to village level data required to identify the rules guiding the implementation of this SAA, we limit
our analysis to the BLP guidelines preceding this amendment.
3A timeline of these changes to the BLPs is summarized in Table B.1. Specific details on the
implementation of the BLPs are reported in the RBI, Report on Currency and Finance annual
volumes of that period.
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of comparison; the cost of a tractor would have been approximately 10 times an
average farm loan).
During the decade of the 1980s, the central government also significantly rein-
forced its priority sector lending initiative aimed at invigorating growth among the
weaker sectors of the economy4. Agriculture, given its high poverty burden as well
as its vital role in achieving self-sufficiency of food production, was considered a
key sector eligible for this directed finance. District level targets were calculated
as a measure of Direct Finance to Agriculture (DFA) as a proportion of total out-
standing credit. Specifically, regulatory guidelines in 1983 stipulated a ratio of 15%
to be achieved by 1985, which was revised upwards to 16% by 1987 and finally
18% by 19905. Compliance was monitored on an annual basis by the District Level
Task Force using data from the previous financial year. Districts falling short of
the threshold were assigned to credit expansion programs in order to achieve the re-
quired targets. Given the close link between the BLPs and the priority sector lending
initiative, we verify that our instruments guiding bank branch growth were indeed
independent from the district level DFA targets. Our results suggest that the deficit
status in access to banking services did not affect a districts’ proportional lending to
the agricultural sector.
Also, pursued during this decade was the Integrated Rural Development Pro-
gramme (IRDP), India’s largest poverty alleviation campaign at the time. The pri-
mary channel for this initiative was targeted subsidized credit intended to increase
productive assets and encourage self-employment among small and marginal farmers,
agricultural laborers, and rural artisans. The overarching objective of this program
was to raise an average of 3,000 below-poverty-line households per administrative
block above this threshold. Launched in 1978, the program initially provided the
same level of financial assistance to each block in order to meet the requirements of
the policy. However, in 1985, the rules guiding the IRDP expenditures changed such
that for the following two years (1985-87) 50% of the allocation received was deter-
mined on the basis of poverty incidence within the block. This was further revised
1987, such that allocation of expenditure thereafter was based entirely on the level
4During the previous decade, regulatory targets had already been introduced compelling banks
to extend at least one third of their outstanding credit to agriculture, small-scale industries, and
small borrowers by 1979.
5A timeline of these changes to the DFA policies is summarized in Table B.1. Regulations
related to this policy can be found in detail within the RBI, Report on Currency and Finance
annual volumes of that period.
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of poverty6. We may expect that additional financial assistance provided under the
IRDP post 1985 may confound with the BLPs if districts which were classified as
deficit in access to banking services were also poorer. As such, we review our main
results when limiting the sample to the two BLP periods prior to 1985 (BLP-1 and
BLP-2) during which the IRDP provided equal assistance across the country. This
robustness test confirms that our results are consistent to this limited time period,
and hence not confounded to the IRDP implementation strategy post 1985.
Following a decade of intensive public sector involvement in poverty alleviation
programs by leveraging rural financial markets, India suffered a severe imbalance of
payments. This forced the central government to largely abandon its social banking
experiment at the dawn of the 1990s. The following decades witnessed instead a
shift towards liberalization of the banking sector and the consolidation of its existing
infrastructure.
Figure 2.1: Rural finance (1978-1990).
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Notes: District-wise data on the number of rural banks and average loan per agricultural holding, aggre-
gated to the country level for each year from 1978 to 1990. Loan per agricultural holding is calculated
as the total direct finance to agriculture divided by the total number of land holdings. Direct finance
to agriculture, reported in Rupees, is deflated using all-India CPI with 1990 base year. Sample of 218
districts.
6A timeline of these changes to the IRDP is summarized in Table B.1. Details of this program
can be found in documents from the Planning Commission of 1980.
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Figure 2.2: Agricultural production and cropped area (1978-1990).
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Year
HYV area Gross cropped area
Area share of HYV
Notes: District-wise data on yield, production, and land area, aggregated to the country level for each
year from 1978 to 1990. Yield and production measures are deflated using all-India CPI with 1990 base
year. Sample of 218 districts.
2.3 Data
For the purpose of this study, we have assembled a detailed dataset on agricultural
production and finance over a ten year period from 1979 to 1988. This enables
us to capture the three BLP periods guiding rural bank branch expansion during
the 1980s7. Our unit of analysis is at the district-BLP level. Districts form the
administrative unit immediately below that of the Indian state. Importantly for
our identification, districts were also the platform used by the BLP regulations to
implement improved access to banking services across the country.
Our banking indicator –number of rural bank branches– was digitized from the
Basic Statistical Reports (BSR) available from the RBIs banking archives. These
reports include district wise information on the number of bank branch offices in
rural, semi-urban, and urban areas. Data on district rural population was obtained
from the 1981 India Population Census. By calculating the ratio of rural population
per bank branch, we recreate the exact criteria by which districts were classified
as deficit in finance (see Table B.2 for details on the construction of the financial
indicators). As reported in panel A of Table 2.1, at the onset of the policy in 1979,
7In 1989, BLP-3 was amended to include a Service Area Approach. Under the SSA, a target
ratio of villages per bank was stipulated. Due to the lack of village level data, we cannot identify
the exact regulations guiding bank growth in this period. As such, we limit our analysis to the
years preceding this amendment.
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91.6% of districts were classified as deficit with an average bank serving approxi-
mately 52,000 people. A decade later, following the three BLP periods we study, the
share of deficit districts had fallen to 37% and the policy target of 17,000 people per
bank branch had been achieved.
We draw upon the Village Dynamics in South Asia Macro-Meso Database (VDSA)
for all data on agricultural indicators. Compiled by the International Crop Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) from various official government data
sources, the database covers all districts for 19 Indian states from 1966 to 2009 (using
1966 district boundaries so as to maintain consistency over time). For the purpose of
this study, we assembled data on key agricultural inputs including land, irrigation,
seeds, fertilizer, and machinery (see Table B.2 for details on the construction of the
agricultural indicators). Additionally, we calculated an aggregate measure of agri-
cultural production and yield using output and farmer harvest prices8 for 15 major
crops9. As in the case of finance, agriculture appears to have witnessed a significant
shift during the 1980s. Average yield increased substantially by over 1,000 Rupees
per hectare from 1978 to 1988, alongside a consistent rise in all inputs over time (see
panel B of Table 2.1).
Weather data, which we use to test the relationship between access to finance
and exogenous rainfall shocks, is jointly produced by the National Center for En-
vironmental Prediction (NCEP) and the National Center for Atmospheric Research
(NCAR) since 1948 (for information and link to the database, see Kistler et al.
(2001))10. The data is extracted from gridded daily datasets, assembled from non-
public weather station information and sophisticated climate models to construct
daily precipitation records for 1◦ (latitude) × 1◦ (longitude) grid points (excluding
ocean sites). We match these grid points to each of the districts in our sample
by taking weighted averages of the total precipitation variables for all grid points
overlapping the district (the weights used are based on the area of each grid point
8These are the producer prices which farmers receive. Due to missing data for prices at the
district level, we estimate prices at the country level for the purpose of our analysis. All prices are
deflated using an all-India CPI with 1990 as the base year.
9The 15 crops are: barley, chickpea, cotton, finger millet, groundnut, linseed, maize, pearl millet,
pigeon pea, rice, rape and mustard seed, sesame, sorghum, sugarcane, and wheat. These 15 crops
account for approximately 74% of total gross cropped area across districts and years.
10The advantage of this data, assembled under the “Reanalysis" project, is that it produces
a retroactive record of global analyses of atmospheric fields using a constant data assimilation
system. This limits errors, such as perceived jumps in climate outcomes, associated with changes
in the operational (real-time) data assimilation methods.
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coinciding with the district). Over the period of our study, India witnessed a series
of widespread droughts. This is reflected in panel C of Table 2.1 which shows a
negative deviation from the long term mean in rainfall11, of -6.1% and -5.8% for the
years 1982 and 1985 respectively.
The complete dataset covers 321 districts, across 15 States of India12. We use
information on changes in district boundaries across census years, presented by Ku-
mar and Somanathan (2009), to bring the banking dataset to 1971 district borders.
This ensures consistency in boundaries between our two data sources. However, as
the BLPs were planned and implemented on 1981 borders, we focus our analysis on
those districts which did not experience any border changes from 1971-1991. This
reduces our sample to 237 districts; 74% of our original dataset. Additionally, we
limit our sample to those districts which have non-missing information on all indi-
cators for all 10 years of data. As a result, we loose an additional 19 districts. This
selection leaves us with a final sample of 218 districts which form the basis for all of
our analysis reported in this study.
2.3.1 Measuring crop choice
In this study, we measure change in the share of GCA grown with crops identified
as having the following characteristics – high volatility, water sensitive, grown in
winter, and cash based.
With respect to high volatility, we are interested in capturing crops which produce
above average under favorable circumstances, but also suffer above average losses
when kept under resource stress. While some studies on yield volatility of individual
crops exist (Muchow, 1989; Singh and Singh, 1995; Rurinda et al., 2014), the results
from these are not comparable as they impose different levels of stress. We therefore
calculate our own measure of volatility. Using data from 1968 to 2000, we compute
the coefficient of variation (CV) in yield for each crop grown at the State level. The
subset of crops with above average relative yield volatility are categorized as high–
volatility. We then calculate the area share (of GCA), at the State level, grown with
these crops. This indicator forms our measure of risky but profitable crop choice13.
11Long term mean is calculated as the average annual rainfall in a district over a 60 year period,
from 1948-2008.
12In 1971 India had a total of 18 States. Covering over 95% of the total population, our sample
of 15 States includes: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh,
and West Bengal.
13The CV allows for comparisons between crops and is therefore preferable to other measures of
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics.
1979 1982 1985 1988
Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Finance
Rural bank branches (Nb.) 40.7570 60.205 83.662 89.070
(27.331) (30.458) (35.082) (36.277)
Population to bank branch ratio (‘000 pp) 52.113 26.363 18.054 16.234
(25.872) (9.253) (5.548) (5.188)
Share of deficit district (%) 0.916 0.860 0.556 0.373
(0.278) (0.347) (0.498) (0.485)
Panel B: Agriculture
Output:
Yield (‘00 Rs./ha) 44.641 52.788 51.549 57.276
(28.711) (29.716) (30.101) (30.353)
Production (Bn Rs.) 1.760 2.080 2.086 2.465
(1.353) (1.458) (1.574) (1.730)
Inputs:
Gross cropped area (‘000 ha) 415.448 422.723 431.078 454.942
(208.155) (212.840) (212.838) (225.795)
Gross irrigated area (‘000 ha) 142.231 157.725 159.055 185.739
(136.327) (146.927) (149.604) (159.239)
Share of HYV (%) 0.271 0.333 0.360 0.413
(0.183) (0.190) (0.197) (0.212)
Nitrogen fertilizer (tons/ha) 0.027 0.035 0.037 0.065
(0.026) (0.035) (0.037) (0.151)
Potassium fertilizer (tons/ha) 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.114)
Phosphorus fertilizer (tons/ha) 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.026
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.046)
Pumps (‘000 Nb.)a 15.598 20.685 28.512
(25.947) (25.450) (29.535)
Tractors (‘000 Nb.)a 0.768 1.277 2.214
(1.305) (1.754) (2.657)
Panel C: Weather
Annual rainfall (mm) 967.872 916.121 931.033 916.533
(392.872) (374.042) (430.781) (343.687)
Deviation in long-term rainfall (%) -1.552 -6.136 -5.896 0.993
(16.295) (12.682) (10.921) (16.122)
Districts 214 215 216 201
Notes: For a description of each variable source and construction, refer to Table B.2. Sample of 218 districts.
Variation in observations are due to missing data on any one of the variables at the district level for that
particular year. aColumn (1) is calculated based on 1977 data, and Column (3) using 1987 data.
Of the 15 major crops, on average 11 varieties are planted in each sample State
dispersion such as the standard deviation. Furthermore, the volatility of a crop depends predomi-
nantly on climatic factors. Therefore, the same crop may show low yield variation in one State and
high variation in another. Using the CV allows for relative categorization, circumventing problems
arising when classifying each crop independently instead of relative to others in the same State.
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and approximately five of these show above average yield volatility. Cotton, sesame,
rapeseed and mustard show particularly high yield volatility in most States.
During the 1980s, the lion’s share of farming in India was rain-fed. Rainfall was
therefore a crucial source of yield volatility. However, while some crops naturally
respond more strongly to water than others, they may not necessarily be more de-
pendent on rainfall if they are largely irrigated. To determine crops most susceptible
to rainfall, we compute a regression of annual rainfall on crop yield; using district
wise data pooled at the State level from 1968 to 2000. For each State, the absolute
values of the t-statistics obtained from these regressions are ranked. In a given State,
the subset of crops for which the effect of rainfall on yield is larger than average are
categorized as rain–sensitive. Across all years, about 38% of the GCA is allocated
to rain–sensitive crops. Rice, sorghum, and groundnut respond strongly to rainfall
in most States. The yields of sugarcane, rapeseed, and mustard on the other hand,
show the weakest correlation with annual rainfall.
Most crops are planted in the summer Kharif season (July to October), as this
period receives the monsoon rainfall. However, some crops such as barley and wheat
are planted during the winter Rabi season (October to March)14. Winter grown
crops are often considered more risky and resource intensive, as they rely on artifi-
cial irrigation. As shown in Figure 2.3, the area dedicated to summer crops is more
than three times as large as the area dedicated to winter crops. Over the study
period, we find that while the aggregate area sown with summer and winter crops
remains approximately stable, the area share of winter crops increases by approxi-
mately 7.5% between 1979 to 1988. As our final indicator of crop choice, we measure
the share of GCA grown with cash crops. These crops cannot be used for household
consumption, as they require post-harvest processing. They are however, generally
considered to be more profitable. Cotton, sugarcane, and oilseeds (including linseed,
soya, groundnut, rapeseed and mustard) are all considered cash crops.
14Among the 15 crops for which we have yield data, barley, chickpea, linseed, mustard, rapeseed,
sesame, soya, and wheat are all winter crops.
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Area summer crops Area winter crops
Area share winter crops
Notes: District-wise data on land area allocated to summer and winter crops, aggregated to the country
level for each year from 1978 to 1988. Summer crops include: cotton, finger millet, groundnut, maize,
pearl millet, pigeon pea, rice, sorghum, and sugarcane .Winter crops include: barley, chickpea, linseed,
mustard, rapeseed, sesame, soya, and wheat. Sample of 218 districts.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Identifying Access to Banking Services
When attempting to evaluate the impact of bank branch growth on agricultural
production choices in a non-experimental setting, one of the main challenges is es-
tablishing a causal relationship. Unless specified otherwise in regulation, we would
expect banks to selectively open new branches in the best agro-climatic regions in
order to serve the most productive farmers. This selection bias likely amplifies the
true impact of access to banking services when using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
In contrast, banks may choose to open new branches in regions with lower baseline
productivity, but higher growth potential, leading OLS to underestimate the true
effects. In order to identify an exogenous source of bank growth, we adopt an instru-
mental variable approach which exploits central-government BLP regulations aimed
explicitly at expanding rural banking infrastructure in India during the 1980s.
At the onset of BLP-1 in 1979, 92% of our sample districts were classified as deficit
according to the RBI stipulated guidelines (see Figure 2.4 for a breakdown of districts
by deficit status during each BLP period). BLP regulations identified districts as
deficit if the ratio of their population per rural bank branch fell above the centrally-
planned threshold of that period (stipulated using the national average at the time,
and calculated using the 1981 India census population and the number of rural bank
branches at the onset of the policy period)15. Licenses for new bank branches, were
to be exclusively distributed to deficit districts. Initial evidence suggests that banks
did in fact adhere to these policies. Specifically, we find that during BLP-1 (1979-
1982), districts classified as deficit experienced an average growth of 69% in the
number of rural bank branches – four times higher than that witnessed on average
among non-deficit districts (see panel A of Figure 2.5). As shown in Figure 2.6,
this significant growth rate in rural bank branches among deficit districts enabled
unbanked regions across India to slowly converge over time to the centrally-planned
target; securing the core objective of this rural banking expansion program.
15For a summary of the BLP regulations, see Table B.1.
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Figure 2.4: Classification of districts at the onset of each BLP period.
Notes: Classification of our complete sample of 218 districts for each BLP period. Districts were classified
using their ratio of rural population per rural bank branch. This ratio was calculated using the 1981
Census of India rural population data and the total number of rural bank branches at the onset of the
policy period (obtained from the Reserve Bank of India Basic Statistical Reserves). For the BLP-1 period,
districts were classified as deficit if the ratio was above 20,000. This was revised down to 17,000 for the
BLP-2 and BLP-3 period.
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Figure 2.5: District growth in the number of rural banks during each BLP period.
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Notes: District-wise growth rates in each Panel is calculated over three years, corresponding to the policy
periods. The vertical cutoff line corresponds to the stipulated target ratio of population per bank branch
for each BLP period; 20,000 for BLP-1 and 17,000 for BLP-2 and BLP-3. Average growth rates of
non-deficit and deficit districts are reported in parentheses on the left and right of the policy cutoff line
respectively. Data on 218 districts.
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Figure 2.6: Mapping of district classification and population per bank branch ratio
at the onset of each BLP period.











































Notes: Classification of deficit status and the ratio of population per rural bank branch for our complete
sample of 218 districts at the onset of each BLP period. For the BLP-1 period, districts were classified as
deficit if the ratio was above 20,000. This was revised down to 17,000 for the BLP-2 and BLP-3 period.
We leverage the exact regulatory targets classifying districts as deficit at the
onset of each consecutive BLP period during the 1980s, in order to generate a time-
varying instrument for bank growth at the district level. Specifically, we exploit the
exogenous shift in bank growth imposed by the policies when reclassifying districts.
For instance, the 188 of our sample districts classified as deficit during BLP-2 (1982-
1985) would have experienced an average growth rate of 52% during this three year
period. As of 1985, at the onset of BLP-3 (1985-1988), 36% of these districts changed
status to non-deficit, halting their rural bank branch growth down to an average of
only 6% over the next three years (see Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 for the classification
of districts and growth in rural bank branches respectively).
We demonstrate the validity and strength of our identification by modeling the
number of bank branches in a district within a given year as a function of its deficit








+ αi + ηt + δs × t+ εit, (2.1)
where i is the district, s is the state, j is the BLP period, and t is the year. Defijt is
a binary indicator which takes the value 1 if district i is classified as deficit in period
j and 0 otherwise. BLPjt is a binary indicator which takes the value 1 for each year
t which overlaps with the given period j and 0 otherwise. We control for district
fixed effects - αi, time effects - ηt, and include state specific time trends - δs × t.
Given that we are specifically interested in capturing bank growth at the district
level, and that each BLP period is implemented over three years, we adapt the








+ ηj + δs × j + εij, (2.2)
where i is the district, s is the state, j is the BLP period. BankGrowthij is measured
as the change in the number of rural bank branches from the onset to the end of each
three year BLP period16. Our instruments of interest are the three interaction terms
between Defij and BLPj, which identify whether a district is classified as deficit in
each BLP period separately. As in equation (2.1) we control for time effects - ηj,








In order to ensure that the BLP regulations guiding rural bank growth expansion
was not correlated with other factors of the rural economy potentially influencing
agricultural growth during this period, we perform a series of placebo tests. We
are particularly interested in ruling out factors such as infrastructure, access to
markets, and preferential rates of finance to agriculture from the priority sector
lending policies ongoing in the 1980s. Using the specification outlined in equation
(2.2), we show that the BLP guidelines classifying districts as deficit in banking
services, were not correlated with growth in road length, markets, and the ratio of
DFA to total outstanding credit. Additionally, we verify that the classification of
deficit status during each BLP period is not correlated to trends in our agricultural
outcome variables prior to the onset of the policy in 1979. This test is conducted by
using the specification from equation (2.2), but with the dependent variable being
the growth rate in our agricultural outcomes for the decade prior to the policy (1969-
1978).
2.4.2 Estimating the Impact of Access to Banking Services
Estimating bank growth via our exogenous instruments, based on the regulatory
guidelines classifying districts as deficit during each of the three consecutive BLP
periods of the 1980s, we can then capture the true impact of improved access to




+ γ2Xij + ηj + δs × j + εij, (2.3)
where i is the district, s is the state, and j is the BLP period. The dependent agricul-
tural indicators – production, input usage, and crop choice – are measured as growth
rates for each three year BLP period. Our coefficient of interest, which captures the
effect of improved access to banking services in a district, is γ1 on the endogenous
variable of BankGrowthij (previously estimated using our instruments identified in
equation (2.2)). Xij is a control variable for exogenous rainfall shock, measured as
the change in annual rainfall over the course of each BLP period. Additionally, we
control for time effects - ηj, and state specific time trends - δs × j (district fixed
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effects are accounted for when taking first differences)17.
In order to further verify the accuracy of our model, we conduct two main robust-
ness tests. First, we estimate the model when removing 10% of districts exhibiting
the highest bank growth rate. This enables us to confirm that our results are not
confined to a select few districts with exponentially high growth rates in improved
access to banking services. Second, we estimate the model by limiting the time
period to the first two BLPs (BLP-1 and BLP-2). At the onset of BLP-3 in 1985,
the IRDP amended its guidelines such that financial assistance was provided based
on poverty levels (see Table B.1 for a summary of the timeline and changes to the
IRDP). By excluding BLP-3, we show that our results are not confounded to the
implementation of this other major welfare program also ongoing during the 1980s.
2.4.3 Interaction of Access to Banking and Weather
As a particular focus to evaluating the impact of access to improved banking services
on agricultural production choices, we are interested in capturing the relationship
between bank growth and exogenous weather outcomes. Access to banking services
could either amplify or attenuate the impact of rainfall on agricultural production
choices. Under favorable rainfall conditions, easing liquidity constraints could enable
farmers to invest in inputs and therefore achieve higher yield levels. Under unfavor-
able conditions such as droughts, farmers could use financial services to mitigate
their potential losses. We test for these hypotheses by allowing for a differential







+ γ3Xij + ηj + δs × j + εij,
(2.4)
where i is the district, s is the state, and j is the BLP period. The dependent
agricultural indicators are measured as growth rates for each three year BLP period.
The change in lag rainfall is measured over a three year period, based on the year
preceding the onset of the BLP period (for instance with BLP-1 (1979-1982), the
change in lag rainfall is calculated from 1978 to 1981). As in equation (2.3), we
control for exogenous rainfall - Xij, time effects - ηj, and state specific time trends -
17The level form for equation (2.3) can be written as: AgriOutcomeit = γ1BankBranchesit
∧
+
γ2Xit + +αi + ηt + δs × t+ εit where i is the district, s is the state, and t is the year.
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δs × j (district fixed effects are accounted for when taking first differences)18.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Bank Compliance to BLP Regulations
As reported in a number of papers documenting the rural bank branch expansion
program of the 1980s (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Fulford, 2013; Kochar, 2011), we
find that the implementation of BLP regulations were predominantly satisfied. As
shown in Figure 2.6, the distribution of deficit districts fell uniformly across India
over the decade during which the BLPs were enforced, allowing the unbanked re-
gions of the country to slowly converge to the centrally-planned policy target. This
initial evidence is further confirmed by our results formally estimating growth in
the number of rural bank branches over time using the explicit policy regulatory
guidelines identifying deficit districts (see equation (2.2)). We find that bank growth
was consistently higher among districts classified as deficit. The highest growth spur
occurred during BLP-1 (1979-1982), wherein the number of rural bank branches in
deficit districts grew by an additional 41% compared to those non-deficit (see column
(3) of Table 2.2). This preferential rate fell to 27% during BLP-2 (1982-1985) and
only 7% during the final BLP-3 (1985-1988) period.19 The Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) F-Statistic on the joint significance of our three interaction terms is approx-
imately 4020. Conclusively, these results support the strength of our instruments in
capturing exogenous variation in bank growth at the district level over time.
Importantly for our identification, we are also able to demonstrate that the reg-
ulations classifying districts as deficit and guiding bank branch expansion were not
correlated to other potentially confounding factors of the rural economy. Specifi-
cally, we show that the deficit status of a district during each BLP period did not
have any effect on the growth in both road coverage and the number of markets
(see columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.2). Additionally, we may be concerned that the
identification of deficit districts for the BLP program may have overlapped with the











+ ηj + δs × j + εij where i is
the district, s is the state, and t is the year.
19Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2 demonstrates the consistency of our results when excluding
year effects and state specific time trends
20With approximately identically and independently distributed errors, the critical value for the
weak instruments test based on maximal TSLS bias relative to OLS of 0.05 at 5% significance level
is 13.91 (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
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identification of districts benefiting from targeted finance to agriculture under the
priority sector lending program also enforced centrally during the 1980s. We find the
growth in the ratio of DFA to total outstanding credit (the policy target of the pri-
ority sector lending program) is uncorrelated with our instruments (see column 6 of
Table 2.2); which we take as evidence that the two policies were in fact implemented
independently. Finally in an additional set of placebo tests (reported in Table 2.3),
we demonstrate that there does not exist any pre-trends between the classification
of districts as deficit during each of the BLP periods and growth in our agricultural
indicators during the decade prior to the program (1969-1978)21. This is crucial in
determining that our instruments.
21Due to lack of data on our indicators for machinery (pumps and tractors) prior to 1977, these






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.2 Agricultural Production and Investment in Inputs
Improving access to financial services at the district level, by building additional
rural bank branches, appears to have significantly increased agricultural yield and
production. Specifically, we find that in response to a 1% growth in banks, aggregate
yield increased by 0.42% during a three year BLP period (see column (1) of Table
2.4). In this study, we are specifically interested in identifying the pathways by which
access to financial services enabled this improvement in agricultural production. One
such pathway is by alleviating liquidity constraints, thereby enabling the adoption
of inputs previously deemed unaffordable. In order to address this hypothesis, we
consider investment in a range of agricultural inputs, including – land, irrigation,
seeds, fertilizer, and machinery.
Our results on growth in inputs, reported in Table 2.4, suggest that a rise in
agricultural yield can be at least partially attributed to a significant shift in the
use of HYV seeds. This evidence corroborates a liquidity constraint hypothesis,
as HYV seeds would have been more expensive then traditional varieties. High
yielding varieties were known to be especially productive under favorable conditions
of water supply and fertilization. It is therefore somewhat surprising that we do not
detect a change in the use of irrigation and fertilizers. We cannot however reject
a re-optimization of these inputs towards HYVs, as our indicators for fertilizer and
irrigation are aggregated across all crops at the district level.
High yielding varieties emerged on the market in India following the green rev-
olution of the 1960s in developing countries. The first of these improved varieties
were focused towards cereal crops. In the VDSA, data on HYVs during the 1980s is
therefore limited to rice, wheat, sorghum, pearl millet and maize. Figure 2.7 shows a
breakdown by crop of the growth in area share of GCA grown with HYVs as well as
the associated growth in yield. We find that while the area share of wheat increased
significantly, this is not reflected in yield growth. This may be attributed to the fact
that HYV wheat would have been available to farmers since the 1960s and if not
regularly replaced by new seeds (the overwhelming majority of farmers re-use seeds
from the previous year harvest) the additional productivity gains from these may
have already started to fall back. On the other hand, we find that rice; which would
have only entered the market in the early 1970s, has a large gain in yield for only a
marginal increase in area share grown as HYV.
Machinery, especially tractors, are a known crucial input for productivity gains
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Figure 2.7: Impact of access to financial services on area share and yield of HYV
crops (1979-82, 1982-85, 1985-88).
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Notes: Estimates are based on model outlined in equation (2.3). Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. Data on 218 districts. Variation in observations are due to missing data on any one of the
variables at the district year level (Non-missing district observation per crop; Rice:N=171, Wheat:N=192,
Sorghum:N=133, Pearl Millet:N=99, Maize:N=162).
on farms. It is with respect to this type of large investment that access to finance
is often hailed as a poverty alleviation tool. Our results, however, do not find a
significant improvement in the number of pumps and tractors with increased access
to financial services. This is not so surprising when we compare the average loan
amount to the cost of a tractor. Using India Census data on the total number of
landholdings in 1981, we calculate the average loan size per farm to be approximately
700 Rupees in the early 1980s and rising to 2,000 Rupees by the end of that decade.
A tractor, during the 1980s, would have cost approximately 10,000 Rupees – at least
5 times as much as the average loan.
These results are robust to excluding both outliers (see panel A of Table B.3) as
well as limiting our sample to the first two BLP periods prior to the IRDP amendment
providing financial assistance based on poverty levels (see Table B.4). Interestingly,
the OLS estimates across all our specifications are much smaller then those from the
IV. This trend is consistent with the hypothesis that banks may be choosing high




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Access to financial services may have served farmers not only by alleviating immedi-
ate liquidity constraints, but also by providing an opportunity to smooth consump-
tion over the agricultural season and thereby engage to riskier but more profitable
production choices. We attempt to capture this second pathway by assessing the
effect of India’s social banking program on patterns of crop choice. We consider four
categories of crops – high volatility, rain sensitive, cash based, and grown in winter
– which are all characterized by en element of risk in their return to investment.
Table 2.5: Impact of access to financial services on crop choice, (1979-82, 1982-85,
1985-88).
Growth in (Area share of): High-Volatility Rain-Sensitive Cash-Crops Winter-Crops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Bank Growth 0.044 0.032 -0.102 0.025
(0.048) (0.032) (0.091) (0.034)
Panel B: IV-TSLS
Bank Growth 0.173 -0.108 0.391** 0.366***
(0.323) (0.114) (0.172) (0.138)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 40.003 40.463 40.199 40.246
Observations 631 625 630 627
Districts 218 215 217 216
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on model outlined
in equation (2.3). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses. The F-statistics
reported is a joint test on our three instruments. Data on 218 districts. Variation in observations are due to
missing data on any one of the variables at the district year level. For a description of each variable source and
construction, refer to Table B.2.
Our first two indicators of crop choice are based on yield variability. In a first
measure, we capture high–volatility crops; those whose yields perform above average
under favorable conditions, but also suffer from above average losses when under
resource stress. As can be seen in column (1) of Table 2.5, improved access to finan-
cial services does not appear to change the share of GCA grown with high–volatility
crops. Our second measure, captures rain–sensitive crops; those whose yields were
especially sensitive to exogenous rainfall shocks. This sensitivity to rainfall, would
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have been particularly relevant in a rain-fed agricultural system; the case of India
during the 1980s. Our results suggest however, that farmers did not change their
allocation of land towards crops most sensitive to rainfall in response to improved
financial services (see column (2)).
For small-scale farmers who rely on their agricultural produce to feed their house-
hold, moving away from subsistence crops (for example rice and wheat) to cash crops
(such as cotton or sugarcane), can be considered risky. While cash crops are often
seen as more profitable, they are also more susceptible to market price fluctuations.
Access to financial services however, appears to have provided farmers with the op-
portunity to take on this risk. Specifically, we find that a 1% increase in the number
of rural banks during a three year BLP period, is associated with an increase of
0.39% in the growth rate of GCA allocated to cash crops (see column (3)).
As a final measure of crop choice, we consider crops grown in the winter Rabi
season (October to March). Since this season does not receive any monsoon rainfall,
these crops are largely dependent on artificial irrigation. Despite this additional
cost, engaging in double cropping (that is, sowing crops in both the summer and
winter season) has the potential to significantly improve agricultural production. As
reported in column (4) of Table 2.5, growth in banks significantly increased the area
share of winter crops; by approximately 0.37% within a three year period22. Taken
together, these results tentatively suggest that banks did provide farmers with a
opportunity to take on additional risk in their production choices.
As in the analysis for agricultural production and investment in inputs, we verify
that our results on crop choice are not dependent on outliers. Results from this
test are reported in Table B.5 and show that all trends and their associated level
of significance remains constant when using a reduced sample of districts excluding
those with the highest growth rate in number of banks. Additionally, we also conduct
our analysis on a reduced time period for the first two BLPs (see Table B.6). While
the result on winter crops is consistent in this sample, we loose magnitude and
significance on our estimate of cash crops. This may be explained by the fact that
adapting crop allocation is a slow process, and considering only a six year period is
insufficient to capture change.
22Among those classified as cash crops only linseed, soybeans, rapeseed, and mustard are planted
in the winter season. The correlation between the growth rates of cash- and winter-crops is positive
but weak, with a Pearson correlation coefficient for the sample period is 0.29
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2.5.4 Production Choices and Weather
In 1998, more than 60% of the cropped area in India was still depended solely on
monsoon rainfall (Organization, 1998). Depending on the location, the monsoon
rains are expected between June and September. According to Kumar et al. (2004),
the highest concentration of rain-fed agriculture in the Western and Southern regions
of India is for oilseed, grain, and cotton cultivation, while in the East is it predom-
inantly for rice. Year-to-year fluctuations in monsoon rainfall directly impacts the
variability of the summer Kharif season (July to October) production (Parthasarathy
et al., 1988). Furthermore, the monsoon also indirectly affects crop production dur-
ing the winter Rabi season (October to March), by providing stored soil moisture
and irrigation.
Access to financial services could amplify or attenuate the impact of rainfall on
agricultural output. Under favorable rainfall conditions, easing liquidity constraints
could enable farmers to invest in inputs and therefore achieve higher yield levels.
Under unfavorable rainfall conditions such as droughts, farmers could use financial
services to mitigate their potential losses (for instance by accessing additional sources
of irrigation). We test for these hypotheses by allowing for a differential effect of
rural bank growth on the relationship between lagged rainfall23 and our agricultural
indicators; including production, input use, and crop choice respectively.
We find that the relationship between agricultural production and lagged rainfall
is elastic. Assuming the growth rate of rural banks to be zero, an increase in lagged
rainfall by 1% is associated with a 1.31% to 1.59% rise in the growth of yield and
production respectively (column (1) and (2) of Table 2.6). This positive relationship
is not surprising, as growing seasons overlap and water is stored from one season
to the next for irrigation. However, our coefficient of interest in this analysis, is
the interaction term between bank growth and lagged rainfall. Our results suggest
a significant negative relationship for both yield and production. We take this as
conclusive evidence that banks serve to attenuate the potential losses from exogenous
negative rainfall shocks. However, banks do not seem to promote further growth or
amplify yields following a positive rainfall period.
Among agricultural inputs, we also find an attenuating relationship between rain-
23The first BLP period is defined from 1979 to 1982. The growth in lagged rainfall for this
period is therefore calculated for the years 1978 and 1981. The analogous process is carried out
when computing the lagged rainfall growth for the second and third BLP-period.
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fall and the growth in irrigated area (column (4) of Table 2.6). Since monsoon rain-
fall is collected and stored for the Rabi season, lagged rainfall is positively related to
GIA. The negative coefficient on the interaction between lagged rainfall and growth
in rural banks suggests that access to financial services enabled farmers to irrigate
land even following a period of drought. In this case, stored rainfall is likely sub-
stituted with more costly groundwater pumped from wells. We find no evidence for
differential effects on the use of land, HYVs, fertilizer, or machinery.
Table 2.7 summarizes the differential effect of bank growth on the relationship
between crop choice and lagged rainfall. We find no statistical evidence for a differ-
ential effect of bank growth on the changes in area share allocated to high–volatility
and rain–sensitive crops (column (1) and (2) respectively) in the year following a
negative rainfall. With respect to cash crops, the positive relationship with bank
growth remains, but we find no evidence for a differential effect related to lagged
rainfall (column (3)). As explained previously, winter crops depend largely on stored
water for irrigation. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a positive effect of lagged
rainfall on the area share of winter crops (column (4)). The negative coefficient on
the interaction term suggests that following poor rainfall, rural bank growth enabled
farmers to continue engaging in double cropping. This result is again consistent
with the attenuating effect of access to financial services on the relationship between



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Impact of banking infrastructure on crop choice with lag rainfall (1979-82,
1982-85, 1985-88).
Growth in (Area share of): High-Volatility Rain-Sensitive Cash-Crops Winter-Crops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Bank Growth 0.057 0.008 -0.119 -0.013
(0.058) (0.027) (0.095) (0.032)
Bank Growth × Lag Rainfall 0.325 -0.216** 0.177 -0.411**
(0.258) (0.096) (0.337) (0.173)
Lag Rainfall -0.234 -0.010 -0.569** 0.154
(0.187) (0.065) (0.270) (0.142)
Panel B: IV-TSLS
Bank Growth 0.333 -0.103 0.327** 0.471***
(0.311) (0.107) (0.165) (0.149)
Bank Growth × Lag Rainfall 0.423 -0.238 -0.346 -1.154***
(0.530) (0.165) (0.360) (0.431)
Lag Rainfall -0.221 -0.023 -0.244 0.585**
(0.264) (0.059) (0.154) (0.235)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 21.326 21.739 21.548 21.605
Observations 631 625 630 627
Districts 218 215 217 216
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on model outlined in
equation 2.4. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses. The F-statistics reported
is a joint test on our three instruments. Data on 218 districts. Variation in observations are due to missing data on




This chapter studies the production effects of a major banking infrastructure pro-
gram, in the context of rural India in the 1970s and 80s. We digitize data on rural
branch expansion at the district-year level from the Reserve Bank of India’s Ba-
sic Statistical Reports, and investigate whether faster growth in banking services
affected agricultural output, inputs, crop choice, as well as the lagged effects of
weather shocks. Our results indicate this is indeed the case. Agricultural yield and
production both reacted positively to bank branch growth. In terms of magnitude,
a 1% growth in bank branches over a 3-year program period translates to a 0.41%
rise in yields at the district level.
This effect is driven by a greater use of higher-yielding cereal varieties, cash
crops, as well as multiple cropping methods. For instance, a 1% growth in rural banks
increased the share of gross cropped area cultivated with cash crops by approximately
0.39% over a program period. This suggests access to banking services may have
allowed farmers to take on more risk, by shifting towards crops more susceptible to
market price fluctuations. Finally, we find that bank growth weakens the lagged
effects of unfavorable weather shocks, through greater use of irrigation.
In estimating the production effects of India’s social banking program, we have
not taken into account the program’s costs, which are substantial (Fan et al. 2008).
We have, however, systematically investigated the channels underlying the earlier
documented effects on poverty alleviation (Burgess and Pande 2005 ;Fulford 2013;
Kochar 2011). Importantly from a policy point of view, the results indicate that
improved access to banking services has the potential to benefit rural communities,
not only through better consumption smoothing, but through meaningful impacts
on a range of production choices.
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Staying ahead or catching up?
3.1 Introduction
Status seeking and habit formation are important characteristics of human behavior
(Smith, 1759; Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949). A growing number of empirical
studies account for inter-household comparisons and find measurable effects on con-
sumption choices (Attanasio and Low, 2004; Maurer and Meier, 2008; Ravina, 2008;
Drechsel-Grau and Schmid, 2014; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2016). The empirical
results are typically obtained from the estimation of log-linearized Euler equations,
derived under a preference specification that allows for relative concerns with respect
to a predefined reference group. The crucial problem with the identification of peer
effects models of this type is related to the reflection problem of Manski (1993):
A priori, it is difficult to distinguish the endogenous effect of peer expenditure on
household consumption from unobserved exogenous and correlated effects. Incon-
sistency from exogenous peer effects arises if members of the reference group share
characteristics that affect their consumption choice in a similar manner. For exam-
ple, the age cohort of households may be a determinant of reference group affiliation
which also affects expenditure profiles. If the households in a reference group face
disturbances that affect their expenditure in a similar way due to common unob-
servable traits, the peer effects model is inconsistent due to correlated effects. For
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example, regional fluctuations and economic growth may affect permanent incomes
and thereby expenditures within a reference group in a similar way.
In this chapter, I estimate the effect of expenditure disparity within a reference
group on household consumption choices. To account for the reflection problem, I
instrument expenditure disparity with the share of households in the reference group
who receive windfall income. Here, windfall income is defined as unexpected income
gains from inheritances, gifts, or lottery wins above EUR 2,5001. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first study that makes use of unexpected income shocks
from inheritances, gifts, and lottery wins as an instrument for average expenditure
disparity. The approach is motivated by empirical findings of Kuhn et al. (2011)
who show that lottery winners increase expenditures for durable and visible goods.
Furthermore, the neighbors of lottery winners were found to increase car related
consumption expenses.
I show empirically that windfalls are not anticipated and increase consumption
growth only in the years after they are realized. In conventional life-cycle models,
transitory income gains have negligible impact on expenditure as households are
assumed to smooth consumption over their lifetime. The sensitivity of consumption
growth to windfall income in my data could be explained by high discount rates
or liquidity constraints. Since windfall incomes increase consumption expenditure,
the share of households who receive unexpected income gains is positively correlated
with consumption disparity, and therefore a relevant instrument.
Other things held constant, suppose a household receives windfall income. As-
sume the arrival rate of windfalls depends on household-specific characteristics but
not on realized windfall incomes within a reference group. In other words, this event
does not impact the expectations of other rational households in the reference group
to win the lottery, make an inheritance, or receive unexpected gifts. Then, the real-
ization of windfall income shocks does not affect other households’ expected lifetime
income –which rules out direct effects on consumption and ensures instrumental va-
lidity. Furthermore, realizations of unexpected windfall income shocks should not
be determined by economic growth, regional economic fluctuations, or other types
of correlated effects that affect the expenditure of all households. While the size
of inheritances and gifts undoubtedly correlates with e.g. economic growth, I treat
arrival rates of unexpected gifts, lottery wins and mortality rates in a modern soci-
1This threshold is determined by the data set. Households are asked if they received unexpected
windfall income from inheritances, gifts, or lottery wins exceeding EUR 2,500 in the previous year.
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ety with a welfare state as exogenous2. Although the realization of windfall income
shocks is uncorrelated across households, fluctuations in windfall shock realizations
over time may covary with changes in observable common traits within reference
groups. For example, it could be argued that the probability of receiving windfall
income depends on exogenous characteristics such as the age of a household –a po-
tential determinant of reference group affiliation. An endogeneity problem arises if
the change in a variable such as age affects changes in both consumption choices and
windfall income realizations. To mitigate endogeneity problems from exogenous ef-
fects, I employ a variety of reference group specifications based on both demographic
and regional characteristics. Moreover, reference group aggregates of demographic
characteristics are included along region and reference group fixed effects to control
for exogenous effects.
To pin down the direction of comparisons, I decompose the effect of average peer
expenditures into disparity to those with higher (i.e. disadvantageous disparity) and
lower (i.e. advantageous disparity) expenditures. Envious preferences may be driven
by upward or downward comparisons in that only the expenses of households above
or below in the expenditure distribution matter. The results indicate that expen-
diture growth is positive in the distance to others higher up in the distribution.
Likewise, increases in the distance to households with lower expenditure lead to re-
duction in expenditure. The relative size of these effects varies across reference group
specifications. For reference groups defined by education, age-cohort, and cohabi-
tation status, the elasticity of expenditure to changes in disadvantageous disparity
is about 0.2. The elasticity of expenditure to changes in advantageous disparity is
approximately 0.22.
The empirical results are derived from a life-cycle framework with forward look-
ing, consumption smoothing agents as presented for example in Browning and Cross-
ley (2009). To account for effects of others’ expenditures on household consumption,
the utility function is augmented by external habits represented by the average ex-
penditure distance to other households in the reference group. I show that under
technical assumptions the optimal consumption path can be represented by an Euler
2Between the years 2000 and 2012, the average deflated windfall income is EUR 46,581. I assume
the threshold of EUR 2,500 is low enough to rule out business cycle effects on the probability of
inheriting. Large gifts may be given to reduce future inheritance taxes. Different to conventional
inheritances, the arrival rate of large gifts is arguably affected by correlated effects. In a robust-
ness check, I restrict the instrument to lottery wins and inheritances. The results do not change
qualitatively.
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equation. This approach builds results of Dynan (2000) who studies consumption
choices with internal habits.
Maurer and Meier (2008) employ a similar theoretical framework. Different to my
approach, they estimate the effect of average expenditure changes and do not allow
for differential peer effects dependent on the position of the household in the expen-
diture distribution. They attempt to overcome part of the reflection problem related
to correlated effects by including the stratification variables in the empirical model
as additional regressors. Since it cannot be ruled out that unobserved demographic
information correlates with aggregated expenditures, a potential consumption ex-
ternality may be spurious. To solve this endogeneity problem, they exploit that
optimal consumption growth rates need to be consistent within peer groups. The
resulting additional equilibrium conditions allow to estimate peer effects indirectly as
a social multiplier operating through peer-group averages of the standard explana-
tory variables. In contrast, I attempt to overcome the reflection problem by directly
instrumenting for the endogenous regressor.
This chapter is closely related to the studies of Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014)
and in particular Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2016). Using the same data, Drechsel-
Grau and Schmid (2014) find that a 1% increase in peer expenditures induces an
increase in household expenditures by 0.3%. Instead of instrumental variables, their
approach relies on state-year time trends to control for unobserved correlated effects.
The similarity of their result suggests that both estimation methods are comparable
in controlling for the reflection problem. Different to this study, they do not find
evidence for downward looking comparisons.
Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2016) follow the GMM-estimation approach outlined by
Ravina (2008) and Maurer and Meier (2008) and allow for both habit formation and
interdependent preferences. Using Spanish data, their results indicate that utility
from consumption services stems in equal parts from peer group, past, and own
consumption. They try to attenuate correlated effects by including measures of the
local unemployment rate and the interest rate faced by the reference group. Their
results are robust across various reference group definitions. Different to this study,
they do not distinguish between up- and downward comparisons and rely on control
variables to account for correlated effects. Again, my results are qualitatively similar
to theirs.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The life-cycle model with
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inter-household preferences is described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 summarizes the
data and the construction of subsamples for OLS and instrumental variable esti-
mation. The empirical strategy with focus on the instrument and the construction
of reference groups is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 contains the results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The life-cycle model with peer group effects
Consider a household i choosing aggregate consumption expenditure c in each year t
to maximize an inter-temporal time-separable utility function that depends in part
on interpersonal comparisons to a continuum of other households. The optimization








s.t. cit+s + ait+s =(1 + rit+s)ait+s−1 + yit+s
aiT ≥0,
(3.1)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the discount factor, x denotes a vector of observed charac-
teristics or taste-shifters3, r the risk-free interest rate at which households can lend
and borrow, a the household’s assets, and y disposable non-interest income. The
expectations operator Et is associated with the households subjective probability
distribution. T − t is the length of the remaining life and u(.) the current or instan-
taneous utility function. Following MaCurdy (1982), the income process is described
by:




it−1 + ηit. (3.2)
The vector z consists of exogenous variables which determine earnings. Shocks
to permanent income yp are represented by η. In this formulation, ω ≥ 0 represents
i.i.d. transitory income shocks –explicitly windfall income from lottery wins, gifts,
and inheritances. Assume transitory windfall shocks are rare events and increase
contemporaneous consumption due to large discount rates4. In equation (3.1), let c̃
3Utility is separable across leisure and consumption choices. Employment status and annual
work hours are included in x to proxy for leisure.
4Alternatively, I could assume T − t is small relative to the income shock. Consumption levels
reflect expectations about the size and time of e.g. future inheritances. Assuming the exact time
and size of the inheritance is uncertain, consumption growth is on average positive once the windfall
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denote consumption services that depend on household consumption and aggregate
expenditures of relevant others. To obtain a simple log-linear approximation of the
Euler equation, c̃ is linear in consumption expenditure,
c̃it = cit − γ(c−it, cit−1), (3.3)
where γ(c−it, cit−1) captures interpersonal expenditure comparisons. Envious
preferences imply that consumption services are affected by the expenditure of oth-
ers. In the simplest specification of interpersonal preferences, γ(c−it) = θc̄−it is the
mean of the expenditure distribution. Alternatively –to model asymmetric interde-
pendent preferences– the mean expenditure of others can be decomposed into the
average distance to those who spend more than i and those who spend less. Let D








= αD(c−it, cit−1) + βS(c−it, cit−1),
(3.4)
where Ft denotes the consumption expenditure distribution in period t. Equation
(3.4) allows to model upward and downward comparisons explicitly. Households with
upward-looking preferences such as envy are unaffected by the average distance to
others with lower consumption (α > 0, β = 0). Likewise households with downward-
looking preferences (e.g. pride) are affected only by the consumption distance to
those with relatively lower consumption (α = 0, β < 0). Note that the disparity
variables in equation (3.4) differ from the familiar measures of relative deprivation
and relative satisfaction5.
The specification suggested here imposes the assumption that households expe-
shock is realized. Kuhn et al. (2011) find empirical evidence for this assumption in the sense that
lottery winners increase car consumption.
5The measures of relative satisfaction and relative deprivation introduced by Yitzhaki (1980) are
defined as the average distance to those with lower and higher income (here expenditure) respec-
tively at a given point in time. Since in Yitzhaki’s specification households choose expenditures
simultaneously, the identification of an effect of others’ contemporaneous expenditures requires
knowledge of the life-time earnings process. Being agnostic about lifetime earnings, it cannot be
empirically determined if a household is affected by contemporaneous expenditure choices of others,
whether her consumption expenditures affect those of others, or if expenditures are governed by
unobserved external shocks. The main difference between the specifications is that past (instead of
present) expenditure of household i is the reference point for relative comparisons.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption disparity.




















rience relative deprivation and satisfaction before choosing own consumption expen-
diture. The distribution of past consumption choices is observed by all households.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the changes in expenditure disparity from the perspective of
household i. The shaded area on the left of cit reflects a change in relative satisfaction;
the shaded area on the right a change in relative deprivation. Prior to choosing con-
sumption expenditure, each household observes the realization of windfall incomes ω
in the population and predicts the spending of others. The household observes how
her consumption in t relates to predicted consumption choices of others and experi-
ences the effect of expenditure disparity. Then, all households choose consumption
simultaneously6. In equilibrium, ∂Ui/∂cit = ∂Ui/∂cit+1 = 0, and capital markets
allow households to transfer funds between periods so that dcit+1 = −(1 + rit)dcit.
Then, the first order condition for this optimization problem results in the following
Euler equation:
6The proof of existence of an equilibrium for the dynamic case is beyond the scope of this study.







 =1 + eit+1, (3.5)
where eit denotes the expectational error of household i which reflects innovations
to income and the consumption distribution. Using the standard iso-elastic utility
specification with σ denoting the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
u(c̃it,xit) = exp(ξ′xit)
(c̃it)1−σ
1− σ , (3.6)




= 1 + eit+1, (3.7)
where κit+1 = α − (α + β)Ft+2(cit+1) and Ft+2(cit+1) denotes the rank of cit+1 in
the consumption distribution at time t + 2. As shown in Appendix C, under a
constant return on wealth, static expectations on the consumption distribution, and




= 1 + eit+1. (3.8)











ln(1 + eit+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
εit+1
. (3.9)
To arrive at an optimality condition in terms of expenditure instead of con-
sumption services, following Dynan (2000) and Muellbauer (1988), ∆ ln(c̃it+1) =
∆ ln(cit+1 − αD(c−i,t+1, ci,t)− βS(c−i,t+1, ci,t)) is approximated by:
∆ ln(c̃it+1) ≈ ∆ ln(cit+1)− α∆ lnD(c−i,t+1, ci,t)− β∆ lnS(c−i,t+1, ci,t). (3.10)
The correlation between the exact expression and the approximation in the data I use
is relatively high when α and β are small. For example, for observations where the
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exact expression is defined, the correlation is about 0.96 when α = β = 0.1, about
0.8 with α = 0.3 and β = 0.2, and about 0.54 when when α = 0.4 and β = 0.6.
Substituting equation (3.10) in (3.9), rolling back one period, and rearranging gives:









where εit = − 1σ ln(1 + eit) and µ =
1
σ
[ln(δ) + ln(1 + r)]. Although the last equation
relates consumption expenditures to their lagged value and consumption disparity,
it should not be interpreted as a consumption function but an optimality condition.
In each period, households choose consumption so that the marginal utility from
consumption services today equals the expected discounted marginal utility from
consumption services tomorrow. Since windfall shocks are i.i.d., current windfall
shocks contain no information about future windfall incomes. Everything else equal,
with envious preferences (α > 0, β = 0), a period t windfall shock to another house-
hold with higher spending reduces consumption services. To smooth consumption
services, the envious household i chooses a higher expenditure than under selfish
preferences (α = β = 0). Assuming no further windfall and permanent income
shocks in the following periods, consumption disparity and household expenditure
decrease. By assumption, the arrival of a windfall shock increases expenditures of
household i. Since increased consumption ceteris paribus also reduces relative depri-
vation, the increase in consumption following a windfall shock to household i will be
smaller compared to the case of selfish preferences. The remainder of this chapter
is dedicated to the estimation of the parameters α and β in equation (3.11) and
the parameter θ in the simple case where interdependent preferences relate to the
arithmetic mean.
3.3 Data
The German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) provides data for more than 12,000
households formed by 20,000 individuals starting in 1984 and for East Germany
following reunification in 1990. From 2002 onwards, a subsample of high income
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households7 is included in the data to mitigate underrepresentation of top earners.
Together with the large number of households followed over many years, the inclusion
of top earners improves representativeness of income distributions. Over the years,
new households were added to the data, some as refreshment to mitigate attrition,
others to capture subpopulations such as migrants.
A representative income distribution and many years of data are indispensable for
consistent estimation of log-linearized consumption Euler equations with preference
interdependence. Attanasio and Low (2004) show that consistent estimation of log-
linearized consumption Euler equations requires micro data covering a long time
period to utilize large-T asymptotics. However, including data from years prior to
2002 reduces the representativeness of the reference group income distributions since
top earners are underrepresented. Additionally, windfall income, the variable used
to construct the instrument for consumption disparity is observed only from the year
2000 onwards. For these reasons, I restrict the analysis to all household heads for the
years 2002 to 2012. Unfortunately, detailed information on consumption expenditure
is only available for the year 2010. However, starting in 1992, respondents were asked
whether they save part of their monthly disposable income. Those who answer yes
are subsequently asked to state their monthly savings. Following Drechsel-Grau
and Schmid (2014) I calculate monthly consumption expenditure as the difference
between disposable income and savings.
Starting with 632,427 observations from 1984 to 2012, the above described re-
strictions lead to omission of 501,675 data points. Next, 1,739 observations without
information on saving behavior are dropped. Of the remainder, 6,845 observations
are excluded as they do not contain information on household income or report an
income of zero. The seven cases in which savings exceed income, and the 2,131 cases
in which individuals state positive savings but fail to report the amount saved in the
follow up question are omitted. On average, 10,938 observations per year remain.
In every year, up to 100 reference groups by occupation and up to 50 by education
are defined. Identification of the effect of changes in consumption disparity requires
representativeness of the reference group consumption and income distributions. If
a reference group contains less than five individuals, it is excluded from the sam-
ple for the given period. About 10% of the occupation reference groups across all
7The subsample consists of 1,224 households with monthly net household income of more than
EUR 4,500.
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years contain five or fewer individuals8. Reference groups by education distinguish
at most 50 subgroups per year and include non-employed (i.e. out of the labor force
and unemployed) individuals. Therefore, only about 1% of the subgroups by educa-
tion contain less than the required number of observations. These observations are
dropped.
For every household, the assessment of personal consumption disparity is assumed
to depend on how lagged consumption compares to relevant others –the reference
group. If reference groups are endogenous, they likely depend on demographic char-
acteristics. Approximately 35% of respondents to the European Social Survey state
that they do not compare to others. Those who compare name work colleagues
(56%), friends (23%), family members (9%), and undefined others (12%) as their
reference group (Clark and Senik, 2010). It can be argued that individuals compare
their own standing to a group similar to them, a group they aspire to belong to in the
future, their own consumption history, or a subset of the entire society perceived as
representative for the region or country. In the empirical literature, reference groups
are defined either across households who share observable characteristics or live in
the same geographical region.
Since survey respondents are not asked if and to whom they compare to, the indi-
vidual specific reference group cannot be identified directly from the data. Further-
more, as shown by Manski (1993), obtaining reference groups from observed behavior
will make any social effects model hold by construction and thwart identification.
Therefore, informed specification of the relevant reference groups is required and will
be based on observable demographic characteristics. Specifically, reference groups
are defined according to (i) occupation-age-gender (ii) occupation-age-cohabitation,
(iii) education-age-gender, and (iv) education-age-cohabitation. Co-workers are the
most frequently cited reference group. In specifications (i) and (ii), the measures of
consumption disparity are calculated by the ten major occupation groups specified
by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). ISCO groups
occupations mainly on the basis of the similarity of skills required to fulfill the tasks
and duties of the jobs9. The age-cohorts are defined by individuals being younger
8In a non-reported robustness test, reference groups with less than 50 individuals are dropped.
This change in the threshold did not qualitatively impact the results.
9The following 10 occupation types form reference groups: (1) legislators, senior officials and
managers; (2) professionals; (3) technicians and associate professionals; (4) clerks; (5) service work-
ers and shop and market sales workers; (6) skilled agricultural and fishery workers; (7) craft and
related trades workers; (8) plant and machine operators and assemblers; (9) elementary occupations;
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than 25, between 25 and 35, between 35 and 45, between 45 and 65, and over 65
years old at the time of the interview. Cohabitation indicates whether the individual
is living together with a life partner. The first and second specification results in 100
separate reference groups. In specifications (iii) and (iv), individuals are categorized
into groups dependent on whether they report less than 10, 10, 11, 12, or more than
12 years of education10. Combined with five age cohorts and gender or cohabitation,
this results in a total of 50 reference groups. When occupation is used as a stratifying
variable, the sample is restricted to employed individuals. If information on less than
50 households is available for a given year from the sample, the respective reference
group is omitted for that year to achieve representative consumption distributions.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on the demographic variables used for ref-
erence group construction. Approximately two thirds are employed and one quarter
are residents in the states of the former German Democratic Republic. Reference
groups defined by occupation type contain on average between 204 and 414 indi-
viduals. Groups defined by education are about twice as large as those defined by
occupation since the latter are restricted to employed household heads.
Table 3.2 summarizes the variables income, windfalls, and the consumption dis-
parity measures. The indicator variable Windfall equals one if unexpected income
above EUR 2,500 originating e.g. from lottery wins, inheritances, or gifts is received
in a given year. The average adjusted and deflated disposable monthly household
income is EUR 1,679 of which on average about EUR 200 are saved. I adjust in-
come and consumption by the square root of the household size. For less than 3%
of the observations monthly savings are zero. This number appears to be unrea-
sonably small. Consequently, by construction the sample participants appear to be
financially better off than the population they represent. Since sample selection bias
cannot be ruled out, the results may not be representative.
(10) armed forces.
10Less than 10 years of school implies that the highest possible degree obtained is a Hauptschula-
bschluss. 10 and 11 years of schooling are required to achieve a Realschulabschluss. After 12 years
of school, the Abitur can be achieved, which enables enrollment for tertiary education.
78
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for demographic variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Year 2006.98 (3.2) 2002 2012 120327
Age 52.5 (16.5) 17 102 120326
Education (years) 12.36 (2.78) 7 18 117147
No. of children 1.65 (0.79) 1 9 31943
Cohabitation 0.65 (0.48) 0 1 120300
Hours (annual) 1217.76 (1144.29) 0 6111 120326
Employed 0.61 (0.49) 0 1 120326
East 0.25 (0.43) 0 1 120327
Male 0.59 (0.49) 0 1 120327
Size group: Occ.-age-gender 204.7 (141.24) 5 646 71355
Size group: Occ.-age-cohabitation 207.53 (158.97) 5 665 71273
Size group: Edu.-age-gender 391.06 (250.33) 7 1089 117136
Size group: Edu.-age-cohabitation 414.1 (280.71) 5 1150 117122
Source: SOEP, v29.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for key variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Windfall 0.03 (0.18) 0 1 120143
Consumption 1481.46 (999.89) 0 124558.09 120327
Income 1679.01 (1288.18) 0.94 127751.9 120327
ln(reference consumption)
(i) Occ.-age-gender 7.36 (0.25) 6.37 8.46 73713
(ii) Occ.-age-occupation 7.36 (0.26) 6.35 8.81 73713
(iii) Edu.-age-gender 7.27 (0.25) 6.34 7.83 120327
(iv) Edu.-age-occupation 7.27 (0.26) 6.37 7.81 120327
ln(disadvantageous disparity)
(i) Occ.-age-gender 5.53 (1.07) -11.03 8.27 68566
(ii) Occ.-age-occupation 5.52 (1.08) -10.51 8.68 68556
(iii) Edu.-age-gender 5.49 (1.05) -4.65 7.74 112669
(iv) Edu.-age-occupation 5.48 (1.05) -12.37 7.71 112652
ln(advantageous disparity)
(i) Occ.-age-gender 4.95 (1.61) -14.92 10.79 68543
(ii) Occ.-age-occupation 4.93 (1.62) -7.39 10.82 68512
(iii) Edu.-age-gender 4.9 (1.64) -7.32 10.81 112644
(iv) Edu.-age-occupation 4.87 (1.65) -7.93 10.82 112649
Source: SOEP, v29.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Suppose households have interdependent preferences in the sense that utility u(c, c̃)
depends in part on own consumption c and the outcomes (i.e. consumption or
income) of relevant others, x̃. In recent years, various explicit functional specifica-
tions for c̃ have been suggested and tested. Luttmer (2005) finds that interpersonal
comparisons drive the inverse relationship between average income and self-reported
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happiness, which suggests that utility decreases in the consumption expenditures
of others. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model preferences as a function of the house-
holds position in the payoff distribution. By letting c̃ = α∑ni=1 max{c−i − ci, 0} +
β
∑n
i=1 max{ci− c−i, 0} they distinguish between inequality averse and spiteful pref-
erences in data from game-theoretic experiments. A growing number of empirical
studies account for inter-household comparisons via c̃ = 1/(n−1)∑j 6=i cj ≡ c̄ and find
measurable effects of c̄ on consumption choices (Attanasio and Low, 2004; Maurer
and Meier, 2008; Ravina, 2008; Drechsel-Grau and Schmid, 2014; Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al., 2016).
Assume additive and inter-temporal time-separable utility U with instantaneous
utility given by u(c, c̃, x), in which x is a vector of taste shifters. Under weak technical
assumptions and a conventional iso-elastic utility specification, the condition which
determines the optimal consumption path can be rearranged so that:
∆cipt = θ∆c̃pt + ∆x′itξ∗ + εipt
εipt = χpt + ηpt + εit.
(3.12)
Equation (3.12) relates changes in consumption to a set of taste shifters and the
consumption choices of other households in a reference group p. As a rearranged
Euler equation, (3.12) should be interpreted as an optimality condition instead of
a consumption function. The parameter θ accounts for interdependent preferences
such as envy or pride.
The crucial problem with the identification of θ is related to the reflection problem
of Manski (1993): A priori, it is difficult to distinguish the endogenous effect of peer
expenditure on household consumption from unobserved exogenous and correlated
effects. Omitted variable bias from exogenous peer effects, denoted χpt, arises if
members of the reference group share characteristics that affect their consumption
choice in a similar manner. It is an empirical fact, that consumption expenditures
are hump-shaped in age (Carroll and Summers, 1991). At the same time, households
may compare their expenditure to others in the same age cohort. Correlated changes
in reference consumption could arise due to interdependent preferences or as a result
of changes in aggregate age.
Furthermore, omitted variable bias arises if the households in a reference group
face disturbances that affect their expenditure in a similar way due to common
unobservable traits or correlated effects. In the error term of equation (3.12), ηpt
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represents such correlated effects. Suppose aggregate household consumption corre-
lates with macroeconomic conditions. Changes in economic growth then manifest in
spurious correlation between household and average consumption expenditure. More
generally, any omitted variable that is correlated both with changes in household and
average consumption expenditure will lead to inconsistent estimates of θ.
To address these threats to internal validity, I use an instrumental variable to
estimate equation (3.12). A valid instrumental variable for c̃ must not contain infor-
mation about changes in permanent income of household i and, at the same time,
provide exogenous variation in consumption expenditures of i’s reference group. Sup-
pose windfall incomes such as inheritances, gifts, or lottery wins affect contempora-
neous household consumption. Then, the share of households in a reference group
which obtain unexpected windfall income in a given period may be a valid instrument
for changes in reference group consumption ∆c̃.
Households may have private information about the size of future gifts and be-
quests and forecast the time of arrival. Moreover, consumption choices throughout
life may reflect the expectation of a future windfall. I assume households do not an-
ticipate the precise date of arrival of a windfall shock, and that its realization causes
an increase in contemporaneous consumption. Figure 3.2 plots the coefficients from
a regression of consumption growth on a binary variable indicating the arrival of a
windfall shock. Consumption growth in the period of a windfall shock increases by
one percentage point at 10% significance. In the periods leading up to the windfall
shock, changes in consumption growth are largely insignificant.
If the share of households who obtain windfall income is unaffected by household
characteristics that move everyones consumption choice in a similar manner, omit-
ted variable bias from exogenous effects is accounted for. For example, if comparison
groups are assumed to be determined by demographic characteristics such as age,
the share of households who obtain windfall incomes should be uncorrelated with
average age in the population. To test the extent to which the instrument accounts
for exogenous effects, I estimate the marginal effect of changes in the share of house-
holds who obtain windfalls on observable demographic variables. Table 3.3 shows
that when both variables are aggregated at a regional level (i.e. German states),
the relationship is insignificant. When this placebo test is conducted at reference
group aggregation for the four specified reference groups, the coefficients remain
insignificant at the 5% level for reference groups (ii) and (iv).
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Windfall income (estimation window)
The share of households who obtain windfall income addresses endogeneity prob-
lems originating from correlated effects if the probability of receiving windfall income
is independent of macroeconomic conditions. Undoubtedly, the value of gifts and
bequests fluctuates with commodity and stock prices or, more generally, economic
conditions. However, in a developed economy with a welfare state, the likelihood
of obtaining unexpected income in a certain year should not be related to economic
conditions. It is possible to test this hypothesis for some macroeconomic variables
at the regional level. Panel B of Table 3.4 presents point estimates for the effect of
changes in the share of households who obtain windfall incomes in a German state
(Bundesland) on changes in income per capita, GDP per capita, the no. of busi-
nesses, the unemployment rate, and energy consumption. As expected, none of the
coefficients is statistically significant.
Since windfall incomes obtained in reference group p do not affect the perma-
nent income of household i, changes in the share of households who receive windfalls
should be an exogenous instrument for changes in average consumption and con-
sumption disparity. In other words, the instrument should not directly affect utility
and therefore not be part of a household’s utility optimization problem. Even if
household consumption increases in windfall income, the effect on others may de-
pend on the nature of the windfall shock. For example, both lottery wins and regular
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Table 3.3: Placebo test (exogenous effects). Relationship between demographic
aggregates and windfall ratio 2002-2012.
Growth in aggregate: Age Educ. Children Cohab. Worker Hours
States -0.047 -0.011 -0.181 0.001 -0.176 -1.822
(0.074) (0.055) (0.179) (0.168) (0.254) (2.086)
(i) Occ.-age-gender 0.116*** 0.070 -0.097 0.386* -0.134
(0.024) (0.051) (0.072) (0.183) (0.235)
(ii) Occ.-age-cohabitation 0.029 0.042 0.164 0.120 -0.124
(0.059) (0.128) (0.145) (0.194) (0.285)
(iii) Edu.-age-gender -0.218* 0.158*** -0.280 -0.412* 0.041 0.839
(0.115) (0.027) (0.177) (0.195) (0.270) (1.637)
(iv) Edu.-age-cohabitation -0.164 0.183* -0.211 1.253* 0.497 2.431
(0.248) (0.095) (0.367) (0.683) (0.331) (2.207)
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by reference group.
Independent variable: ∆Windfall ratio, which indicates change in the share of households which obtained
windfall incomes in a reference group. Source: SOEP, v29.
Table 3.4: Placebo test (correlated effects). Relationship between macroeconomic indicators and
windfall ratio 2002-2012.
Dependent variable: ∆Income/capita ∆GDP/capita ∆Businesses ∆Unemployment rate ∆Energy cons.
∆Windfall ratio 1,453.831 17,107.601 -53.216 7.683 20.920
(1,522.162) (16,113.194) (73.131) (5.959) (92.092)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 116 116 116 116 112
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by state. ∆Windfall ratio indicates change in
the share of households which obtained windfall incomes in a state. Source: SOEP, v29.
wage increases may temporarily increase consumption growth but may be perceived
differently by others who try to keep up. Empirical evidence suggests that windfall
shocks affect consumption choices of relevant others. Kuhn et al. (2011) find evidence
for social effects of lottery prizes on the car consumption of neighbors of winners.
Having an immediate neighbor win the lottery significantly raises the probability of
a car purchase. Compared to the modest effects of lottery prizes on the consumption
choices of winning households, the effect on neighbors is large.
In this study, I focus on the local average treatment effect of changes in consump-
tion disparity caused by windfalls on household consumption choices. On average,
about 3% of the sample population report to have received unexpected income of
EUR 2,500 or more in a given year. The average value of a windfall shock during
the period 2002 and 2012, deflated and adjusted for household size, is EUR 29,250.
For comparison, the average adjusted and deflated monthly net disposable household
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income in the sample is EUR 1,679. Table 3.5 shows that changes in the share of
households in the reference group who obtain windfall income are strongly related
to the measures of consumption disparity for demographic reference group specifica-
tions. Under geographical reference groups, the first stage is not identified. Going
forward, I restrict the analysis to reference groups defined by demographic character-
istics. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, distributed as chi-squared with
one degree of freedom, exceeds the 5% critical value for specifications (i)-(iv) and
tabulated minimal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS. On all four specifica-
tions, the signs on the coefficients are as expected. This suggests that the instrument
is strongly related to changes in aggregate consumption and consumption disparity
for some reference groups.
Table 3.5: First Stage. Relationship between average reference
consumption and windfall income.
Dependent variable: ∆c̄−i,t ∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) ∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t)
States -0.002 0.058 0.267
(0.022) (0.217) (0.374)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 0.01 0.07 0.51
(i) Occ.-age-gender 0.432*** 1.736*** -1.011***
(0.032) (0.185) (0.223)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 186.83 87.71 20.59
(ii) Occ.-age-cohab. 0.476*** 1.615*** -1.098***
(0.030) (0.208) (0.230)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 246.03 60.51 22.86
(iii) Edu.-age-gender 0.231*** 1.191*** 0.707***
(0.021) (0.173) (0.241)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 125.79 47.27 8.64
(iv) Edu.-age-cohab. 0.415*** 1.435*** -1.108***
(0.025) (0.188) (0.265)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 278.6 58.57 17.44
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Small-case letters indi-
cate logarithms. ∆c̄−i,t is the growth rate of peer consumption, ∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) is the
growth rate of consumption disparity to others higher ranked in the expenditure distribu-
tion, ∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) is the growth rate of consumption disparity to others lower ranked in
the expenditure distribution. Independent variable: ∆Windfalli,t indicates change in the




Table 3.6 summarizes the relationship between changes in household consumption,
windfall income, and average consumption for four different reference group specifica-
tions. The point estimates obtained from OLS in panel A do not indicate significant
effects of windfall and average consumption on household consumption growth at
conventional significance levels. Besides state, time, and reference group fixed ef-
fects, the regressions contain demographic control variables such as changes in age,
education, employment status, or growth in annual hours worked. Reference group
averages of all demographic control variables are included. The results in panel A
contradict the findings of Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014) who report significant
effects of changes in average consumption. The source for the discrepancy appears
to be the inclusion of aggregated demographic control variables. By controlling for
changes in reference group aggregates, omitted variable bias from exogenous effects
may be mitigated –potentially at the cost of losing relevant variations in consump-
tion expenditure. When this restriction is removed, the I find envious preferences
for all reference group specifications.
Panel B contains point estimates obtained from instrumenting11 average con-
sumption expenditures with the proportion of households in the reference group who
received windfall income. To avoid endogeneity, demographic household character-
istics and reference group aggregates are omitted from the set of control variables
employed in panel A. The coefficients on the change in windfall income suggest that
a positive windfall shock is accompanied by an increase of 1% (at 10% significance)
in consumption growth for the average household for most specifications. Different
to panel A, when reference groups are defined by cohabitation and average consump-
tion is instrumented, the point estimates indicate envious preferences. Surprisingly,
reference groups defined by gender instead of cohabitation status do not confirm this
finding. The discrepancy in results suggests that weighting household consumption
expenditure by the square root of the number of individuals living in the household
may lead to considerable measurement error. Even after adjusting for household size,
consumption expenditure of a family household may not be comparable to expendi-
tures of a single household. For this reason, I focus on interdependent preferences
identified in comparisons between households who share the same cohabitation sta-
11All two-stage least squares IV estimates in this thesis are computed with the ivreg2 package
by Baum et al. (2002).
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Table 3.6: Consumption with interdependent preferences and
habits. Reference groups by occupation-age-gender.
Dependent variable: ∆ci,t (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A. OLS
∆Windfall income 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
∆c̄−i,t -0.035 0.029 -0.033 0.018
(0.024) (0.022) (0.036) (0.034)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic aggregates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52,601 52,555 91,035 91,040
R̄2 0.024 0.024 0.019 0.019
Panel B. IV 2SLS
∆Windfall income 0.010* 0.011* 0.008 0.009*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
∆c̄−i,t -0.068 0.249** -0.362 0.704***
(0.136) (0.119) (0.310) (0.192)
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic 186.581 246.574 125.749 278.593
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,613 53,569 91,185 91,184
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Small-case letters
indicate logarithms. Dependent variable: ∆cit is household consumption growth.
∆c̄−i,t denotes growth in peer consumption. Reference groups according to (i)
occupation-age-gender, (ii) occupation-age-cohabitation, (iii) education-age-gender,
(iv) education-age-cohabitation. Demographic control variables are growth rates of
age, age-squared, years of education, no. of adults in household, no. of children in
household, annual work hours, cohabitation. Aggregates controls are the changes in
the group averages of the demographic controls. Instrumented: ∆c−i,t. Excluded
instrument: ∆Windfallratio. Source: SOEP, v29.
tus.
The point estimate of about 0.25 in specification (ii) is of similar magnitude as
the estimates reported in Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014) and Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2016) in comparable empirical models. The coefficient on the change in peer
consumption of about 0.7 in specification (iv) is surprisingly large and suggests a
relatively high elasticity of household consumption with respect to aggregate refer-
ence group consumption expenditure. The point estimates suggest that an increase
in peer consumption of 1% –induced by windfall income obtained in the reference
group– increases average household consumption by 0.25% or 0.7% dependent on the
reference group specification. A potential reason for the large spread between the
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point estimates is that reference groups defined by education include more house-
holds and less groups, which results in a better approximation of the reference group
consumption distributions. The Kleibergen Paap F-statistics suggest that for all
specifications, the instrument is strongly related to the endogenous variable.
In Table 3.7 the effect of peer consumption is decomposed into the disparity
to households with higher and lower consumption expenditure. Panel A contains
the results obtained by OLS estimation. The point estimates on the change in
windfall income are of similar magnitude as in the previous table and significantly
positive for reference groups by cohabitation status. For all reference groups, the
results suggest small but significant effects of advantageous and disadvantageous
consumption disparity on household consumption expenditure. Households appear
to have on average upward and downward looking preferences. In contradiction
to Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014), the elasticity of household consumption with
respect to advantageous consumption disparity is larger than the elasticity with
respect to disadvantageous disparity. Taken together, the results suggest prideful
and envious preferences, in that part of the household consumption expenditure
serves the purpose of staying ahead of others lower in the consumption distribution
as well as keeping up with others ranked higher in the distribution.
Panel B summarizes the results obtained by two-stage least squares IV estima-
tion. Again for all specifications, a windfall income shock is associated with an
increase in consumption growth by about 1%, which is significant for specifications
(ii) and (iv). Consistent with the results reported in the previous table, the point
estimates suggest interdependent preferences for reference groups defined by cohab-
itation. Increases in the disparity to those with higher consumption –induced by
changes in the proportion of windfall incomes– causes the average household to in-
crease consumption expenditure to keep up. Analogously, an increase in the dispar-
ity to others with lower consumption causes a reduction in household consumption
expenditure. Since changes in household expenditures are related to variations in
consumption disparity originating from changes in the share of unexpected windfall
incomes, these coefficients imply prideful and envious preferences. The arrival of a
windfall for one household does not affect permanent income for other households
and therefore contains no information on own future advances. This fact rules out
alternative explanations such as the tunnel effect of Hirschman (1973).
Consider column (iv) in panel B of Table 3.7. The elasticity of consumption
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to disadvantageous consumption disparity is about 0.2. A 1% increase in the con-
sumption distance to those with the same level of education, cohabitation status,
and age-cohort whose contemporaneous consumption exceeds the household’s refer-
ence (i.e. past) consumption is associated with an increase in own consumption by
about 0.2%. Likewise, the elasticity of consumption to advantageous disparity is
about 0.22 and a 1% decrease in the consumption distance to those who reported
smaller consumption levels in the previous year is associated with an increase in
own consumption by about 0.22%. These point estimates suggest that the average
individual prefers to keep up with and stay ahead of similar others in the consump-
tion distribution. As in Table 3.6, the point estimates are smaller in magnitude in
column (ii) in panel B with consumption elasticities of 0.07 and 0.09 with respect
to disadvantageous and advantageous disparity. These results are surprising in that
they suggest that households with interdependent preferences are affected at least as
much by the expenditure distance to others who consume less as they are affected
by the distance to those who consume more.
For some specifications, the coefficients on consumption disparity are asymmet-
ric in size. Considering results from instrumental variable regressions reported in
columns (ii) and (iv) of Table 3.7, the point estimates on advantageous consumption
disparity are weakly larger. This asymmetry could reflect inherent preferences in
that staying ahead of others in terms of consumption is more relevant than catching
up. Alternatively, it may be driven by the shape of the consumption distribution.
Suppose for example that the effect of others’ consumption choices depends on the
household’s position in the income distribution. For example, if households with be-
low average income have envious but not prideful preferences, and households with
above average income have prideful but not envious preferences, then similar point
estimates would emerge. In this case, the estimated prideful and envious preferences
would not be representative for any household.
To account for heterogeneous interdependent preferences, I estimate the empirical
model by reference group income quartile. Table 3.8 summarizes the results for
occupation-age-cohabitation reference groups. Panel A contains the point estimates
from OLS regression. Both the coefficient on average consumption and the measures
of advantageous and disadvantageous consumption disparity appear to be similar
across income quartiles. When consumption disparity is instrumented, the point
estimates confirm that interdependent preferences are relatively consistent across
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Table 3.7: Consumption with interdependent preferences and habits.
Reference groups by occupation-age-gender.
Dependent variable: ∆ci,t (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Panel A. OLS
∆Windfall income 0.007 0.008* 0.006 0.007*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.070*** -0.068***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic aggregates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,774 50,655 89,701 89,681
R̄2 0.116 0.114 0.119 0.119
Panel B. IV 2SLS
∆Windfall income 0.009 0.011** 0.008 0.010**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
∆di
∧
(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.027 0.071** -0.074 0.204***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.064) (0.052)
∆si
∧
(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.067 -0.092** -0.128 -0.222***
(0.062) (0.045) (0.087) (0.064)
Kleibergen Paap F-stat. (dis) 87.533 60.858 47.286 58.982
Kleibergen Paap F-stat. (adv) 20.474 22.802 8.570 17.475
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52,605 52,559 90,544 90,520
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable: ∆(cit).
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) is the growth rate of consumption disparity to others higher ranked in the expen-
diture distribution, ∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) is the growth rate of consumption disparity to others lower
ranked in the expenditure distribution. Reference groups according to (i) occupation-age-gender,
(ii) occupation-age-cohabitation, (iii) education-age-gender, (iv) education-age-cohabitation. De-
mographic control variables are first differences of age, age-squared, years of education, no. of
adults in household, no. of children in household, average work hours per workday, cohabitation.
Reference group controls are the changes in the group averages of the demographic controls.
Instrumented: ∆ci,t−1. Excluded instrument: ∆Windfall−i,t. Source: SOEP, v29.
income quartiles. This result is inconclusive since the instrument is weak for some
income quartiles. The tendency to keep up with others who consume more appears
to be U-shaped in the household’s rank in the income distribution.
Including non-employed households in the sample and defining reference groups
according to years of education, age-cohort, and cohabitation suggests that prefer-
ences do not vary substantially with the position of the household in the group-
specific income distribution. The point estimates by reference group income quartile
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneity analysis by income quartile in the reference group income
distribution. Reference groups by occupation-age-cohabitation.
Reference group income quartile
Dependent variable: ∆ci,t 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Panel A. OLS
∆c̄−i,t 0.080* 0.081** 0.070* 0.070
(0.045) (0.035) (0.037) (0.046)
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.064*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.026***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004)
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.052*** -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.081***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,281 13,124 13,180 12,070
Panel B. IV 2SLS
∆c̄
∧
−i,t 0.075 0.559*** 0.393** 0.403*
(0.220) (0.195) (0.191) (0.234)
∆d
∧
i(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.066 0.253*** 0.168** 0.093**
(0.074) (0.086) (0.081) (0.047)
∆s
∧
i(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.126 -0.328** -0.156*** -0.179*
(0.175) (0.138) (0.053) (0.093)
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆di) 35.014 13.052 8.246 20.816
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆si) 1.514 4.893 13.527 7.474
Observations 13,218 13,543 13,495 12,303
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Small-case letters indicate logarithms. Dependent
variable: ∆(cit) is household consumption growth. ∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) is the growth rate of consumption disparity
to others higher ranked in the expenditure distribution, ∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) is the growth rate of consumption
disparity to others lower ranked in the expenditure distribution. Inequality measures calculated with reference
groups according to occupation-age-cohabitation. Each coefficient stems from a separate regression where the
sample is restricted to individuals in a quartile of the income distribution of their reference group. Demographic
control variables are first differences of age, age-squared, years of education, no. of adults in household, no. of
children in household, annual work hours, cohabitation. Reference group controls are the changes in the group
averages of the demographic controls. Instrumented: ∆c̄−i,t, ∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t), ∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t). Excluded
instrument: ∆Windfall−i,t. Source: SOEP, v29.
for this specification are summarized in Table 3.9. Consider the results obtained by
OLS in panel A. Again, when interdependent preferences are defined by the position
of a household in the consumption distribution, prideful and envious preferences ob-
tain for all reference group income quartiles. When average peer income is assumed
to capture interdependencies, envious preferences obtain only for the bottom income
quartile. The point estimates from two-stage least squares IV estimation are re-
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ported in panel B. The marginal effect of peer consumption changes drastically. For
the top 75% of the income distribution, the point estimates suggest unreasonably
strong envious preferences. Using the alternative preference specification, prideful
and envious preferences obtain for the top 75% of the income distribution. Again,
the results are not conclusive since for some specifications, the instrument is weak.
The classification by reference group income quartiles is arbitrary and pools
households with substantially different income and consumption profiles. As a ro-
bustness check, I therefore restrict the subsamples to quartile position of the house-
hold in the overall income distribution in a given year. The results are reported
in Table C.1 (for reference groups defined by occupation-age-cohabitation), and Ta-
ble C.2 (for reference groups by education-age-cohabitation) of the Appendix. For
the top half of the income distribution, the results are similar for both reference
group specifications. Taken together, if the instrumental variables are strongly re-
lated to the endogenous variable, the evidence suggests that envious and prideful
preferences obtain for most income quartiles.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that interpersonal comparisons obtain for some reference
group specifications when endogeneity problems stemming from correlated and ex-
ogenous effects are accounted for. Omitted variable bias from unobserved correlated
and exogenous effects is the most important endogeneity problem for estimating
Euler equations with peer effects. For example, unobserved economic growth may
increase both household consumption and consumption disparity. To mitigate po-
tential omitted variable bias from non-linear economic growth, I estimate a life cycle
model using the share of windfall income in the reference group as an instrument
for consumption disparity. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that
makes use of unexpected income shocks from inheritances, gifts, and lottery wins
as an instrument for consumption disparity. This approach is motivated by empir-
ical findings of Kuhn et al. (2011) who show in a study on the effects of lottery
outcomes that winners increased expenditures for cars and durables. I confirm the
result of envious preferences with reference groups defined by occupation/education,
age-cohort, and cohabitation status.
I decompose the effect of average consumption by similar others into consumption
disparity to those with higher and lower consumption than household i. The aver-
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Table 3.9: Heterogeneity analysis by income quartile in the reference group income
distribution. Reference groups by education-age-cohabitation.
Reference group income quartile
Dependent variable: ∆ci,t 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Panel A. OLS
∆c̄−i,t 0.201*** 0.012 0.060 0.046
(0.061) (0.047) (0.054) (0.073)
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.083*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.026***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004)
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.053*** -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.101***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,233 22,901 22,778 22,128
Panel B. IV 2SLS
∆c̄
∧
−i,t -0.181 0.757** 1.109*** 0.946***
(0.416) (0.329) (0.339) (0.294)
∆di
∧
(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.093 0.256*** 0.385*** 0.500***
(0.152) (0.080) (0.088) (0.173)
∆si
∧
(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -17.548 -0.267*** -0.365*** -0.490***
(1159.022) (0.098) (0.099) (0.156)
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆di) 17.912 22.235 23.030 8.962
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆si) 0.000 6.780 11.289 8.194
Observations 23,283 22,941 22,805 22,155
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Small-case letters indicate logarithms. Depen-
dent variable: ∆(cit) is household consumption growth. Inequality measures calculated with reference groups
according to education-age-cohabitation. Each coefficient stems from a separate regression where the sample is
restricted to individuals in a quartile of the income distribution of their reference group. Reference groups exclude
individuals living in the same state. Demographic control variables are first differences of age, age-squared, years
of education, no. of adults in household, no. of children in household, annual work hours, cohabitation. Refer-
ence group controls are the changes in the group averages of the demographic controls. Instrumented: ∆c̄−i,t,
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t), ∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t). Excluded instrument: ∆Windfall−i,t. Source: SOEP, v29.
age household increases consumption expenditure when the distance to others higher
ranked in the expenditure distribution grows. Likewise, increases in the consumption
distance to households ranked lower in the expenditure distribution leads to reduced
consumption expenditures. Since exogenous variations in consumption disparity are
related to household consumption, this behavior can not be explained by changes
in expectations about future income as postulated by Hirschman (1973). Further-
more, estimation of the life cycle model by income quartile suggests that envious
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preferences are not an artifact of the log-normal shape of the consumption distribu-
tion. Conclusively, households are found to have envious and prideful preferences
and choose consumption to catch up or stay ahead of others.
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Appendix A
Derivation of equation (1.2)
The utility function with interdependent preferences of F&S is given by equation
(1.1). Assume of the n individuals in the society, k − 1 individuals are poorer or
at least as rich and n − k individuals richer than i. Add and subtract βiµi(x−i) =
βi(n− 1)−1
∑
j 6=i xj on the right. Equation (1.1) can be rearranged so that


















































































In the last equation of (A.1), the term βixin(n − 1)−1 is added and subtracted.
Rearranging gives (A.2) where max{xj − xi, 0} = (
∑
xi<xj xj)− (n− k + 1)xi
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+ βi
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where µ is the mean income in the society. For large n, equation (A.2) is approx-
imately identical to





max{xj − xi, 0} (A.3)
Proof of positive covariance between mean reference income
and disadvantageous income inequality for non-degenerate in-
come distributions
The covariance of µ(x−i) and Di(x) can be rearranged as follows.
















since both µ(x) and D(x) are constant ∀i ∈ N . For every i ∈ N :
• xi ≥ µ(x) =⇒ µ(x−i) ≤ µ(x) ∧Di(x) ≤ D(x)
• xi < µ(x) =⇒ µ(x−i) > µ(x) ∧Di(x) > D(x)







Table B.1: Poverty alleviation programs (BLP, DFA, IRDP) during the
1980s.
Year Policy Regulation
1979 BLP-1 New bank branches directed to districts with more than 20,000
people per bank branch
IRDP Financial assistance unified across all blocks
1982 BLP-2 New bank branches directed to districts with more than 17,000
people per bank branch
1983 DFA-1 Target of 15% (proportion of total outstanding credit loaned
as direct finance to agriculture) to be reached by March 1985
1985 DFA-2 Target of 16% (proportion of total outstanding credit loaned
as direct finance to agriculture) to be reached by March 1987
BLP-3 New bank branches directed to districts with more than 17,000
people per bank branch
IRDP Financial assistance split such that 50% of the allocation
received is based on poverty level at the block
1987 DFA-3 Target of 18% (proportion of total outstanding credit loaned
as direct finance to agriculture) to be reached by March 1990
IRDP Financial assistance based entirely on poverty level at the
block





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5: Impact of access to financial services on crop choice: Removing outliers
(1979-82, 1982-85, 1985-88).
Growth in (Area− Share): High-Volatility Rain-Sensitive Cash-Crops Winter-crops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Bank Growth (IV-TSLS)
Bank Growth 0.181 -0.118 0.388** 0.387***
(0.317) (0.118) (0.180) (0.144)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 35.917 36.240 36.053 36.087
Panel B: Interaction of Bank Growth and Lag Rainfall (IV-TSLS)
Bank Growth 0.269 -0.125 0.308* 0.463***
(0.293) (0.113) (0.178) (0.163)
Bank Growth × Lag Rainfall 0.732 -0.278 -0.295 -1.119**
(0.621) (0.216) (0.456) (0.506)
Lag Rainfall -0.282 -0.032 -0.259 0.539**
(0.272) (0.063) (0.161) (0.243)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 19.217 19.624 19.426 19.522
Observations 574 568 573 570
Districts 197 194 196 195
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Estimates for panel A are based on the model
outlined in equation (2.3), and equation (2.4) for panel B. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and
reported in parentheses. The F-statistics reported is a joint test on our three instruments. Data on 218 districts.
Variation in observations are due to missing data on any one of the variables at the district year level. For a
description of each variable source and construction, refer to Table B.2.
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Table B.6: Impact of access to financial services on crop choice: Prior to IRDP
(1979-82, 1982-85).
Growth in (Area share of): High-Volatility Rain-Sensitive Cash-Crops Winter-Crops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Bank Growth -0.015 0.032 -0.120 -0.011
(0.049) (0.033) (0.097) (0.036)
Panel B: IV-TSLS
Bank Growth -0.277 -0.127 0.222 0.361**
(0.315) (0.144) (0.230) (0.160)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 31.712 31.725 31.712 31.742
Observations 431 427 431 429
Districts 218 215 217 216
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on model outlined
in equation (2.3). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses. The F-statistics
reported is a joint test on our three instruments. Data on 218 districts. Variation in observations are due to
missing data on any one of the variables at the district year level. For a description of each variable source and




This Appendix shows that under constant return on wealth and static expectations
on the consumption distribution, such that Et[Ft+1(cit)] = Et[Fs(cis+1)] for s =
t + 2, ..., T − 1, the first order condition can be simplified. The proof is borrowed
from Hayashi (1985), in which consumption services are modeled as a distributed lag
function of current and past expenditures. It needs to be shown that the first order









= 1 + eit+1. (C.2)
Let MUit+s = ∂ui(c̃it+s)/∂c̃it+s, for s = 1, 2, , ..., T − t, represent the partial
derivative of current utility with respect to current consumption services. Rewrite







δ(1 + r)Et[MUit+1 + δκit+1MUit+2] = Et[MUt + δκitMUt+1]
Et[(δ(1 + r)MUt+1 −MUt) + δκit((1 + r)MUt+2 −MUt+1)] = 0
(C.3)
where the last equality follows from
Et[κit+1] =Et[α− (α + β)Ft+2(cit+1)− θ]
=α− (α + β)Et[Ft+2(cit+1)]− θ
=α− (α + β)Et[Ft+1(cit)]− θ
=Et[κit],
(C.4)
since all households smooth consumption and do not anticipate changes to the con-
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sumption distribution Et[Ft+2(cit+1)] = Et[Ft+1(cit)]. Let
tyit+k = Et[δ(1 + r)MUit+k+1 −MUit+k] (C.5)
so that equation (C.3) becomes
tyit + δEt[κit]tyit+1 = 0. (C.6)
Condition (C.6) holds throughout life, which implies
syis + δEs[κis]syis+1 = 0, s = t, t+ 1, ..., T − 1 (C.7)
and syiT = −Es[MUiT ]. Applying the expectations operator at time t to equation
(C.7) yields
tyis + δEt[κis]tyis+1 = 0, s = t, t+ 1, ..., T − 1 (C.8)
Now substituting xiτ =t yit+τ into equation (C.8) gives
xis−t + δEt[κis]xis−t+1 = 0 (C.9)
Equation (C.9) is a non-autonomous first-order difference equation in xi, which
can be solved by iteration such that xis−t+1 =
∏s−t
j=0[(−1/(δEt[κij]))xi0]. Under the
assumptions 0 < δ < 1 and |Et[κis]| < 1/δ, for s = t, t + 1, ..., T − 1, the equation
is divergent and xi0 is small relative to the terminal value12. The first assumption is
standard in the literature and implied by the stronger assumption of large discount
rates. The second assumption places boundaries on α and β. Since Fs ∈ [0, 1], this
assumption can be restated
|β| < 1/δ and |α| < 1/δ, (C.10)
The existence of an equilibrium requires small values for α and β. The discount
rate is assumed to be large so that windfall shocks affect current period consumption.
Taken together, these factors suggest that the second assumption is fulfilled. Since
the difference equation is unstable, the initial value xi0 must be small relative to the
12A third assumption, Et[κis] 6= 0, is implied directly. If it is violated, the result follows imme-
diately from equation (C.1).
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= 1 + eit+1. (C.11)
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Table C.1: Heterogeneity analysis by income quartile in the sample income distri-
bution. Reference groups by occupation-age-cohabitation.
Income quartile
Dependent variable: ∆ci,t 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Panel A. OLS
∆c̄−i,t 0.147*** 0.032 0.029 -0.059
(0.055) (0.043) (0.036) (0.042)
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.022***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.048*** -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.080***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,451 11,833 15,376 17,895
Panel B. IV 2SLS
∆̂c̄−i,t -0.452 0.220 0.246 0.575***
(0.558) (0.253) (0.155) (0.206)
∆̂di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.371 0.054 0.079** 0.155***
(1.429) (0.085) (0.039) (0.043)
∆̂si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.007 -0.064 -0.078* -0.183***
(0.170) (0.130) (0.042) (0.052)
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆di) 0.083 13.495 35.130 33.130
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆si) 1.492 2.338 24.581 28.025
Observations 7,774 12,064 15,646 18,085
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Small-case letters indicate logarithms. Dependent
variable: ∆(cit). Inequality measures calculated with reference groups according to education-age-cohabitation.
Each coefficient stems from a separate regression where the sample is restricted to individuals in a quartile of
the income distribution. Reference groups exclude individuals living in the same state. Demographic control
variables are first differences of age, age-squared, years of education, no. of adults in household, no. of children in
household, indicator for repeated survey completion, annual work hours, cohabitation. Reference group controls
are the changes in the group averages of the demographic controls. Instrumented: ∆c̄−i,t, ∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t),
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t). Excluded instrument: ∆Windfall−i,t. Source: SOEP, v29.
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Table C.2: Heterogeneity analysis by income quartile in the sample income distri-
bution. Reference groups by education-age-cohabitation.
Income quartile
Dependent variable: ∆ci,t 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Panel A. OLS
∆c̄−i,t 0.058 0.085 -0.007 -0.068
(0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.102)
∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.081*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -0.047*** -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.093***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference group controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,721 22,984 23,337 23,998
Panel B. IV 2SLS
∆̂c̄−i,t 1.077** -0.216 0.775** 0.784***
(0.492) (0.437) (0.336) (0.281)
∆̂di(ci,t−1, c−i,t) 0.471*** 0.009 0.198*** 0.487**
(0.155) (0.087) (0.058) (0.213)
∆̂si(ci,t−1, c−i,t) -1.753 0.062 -0.240*** -0.353***
(4.073) (0.363) (0.087) (0.098)
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆di) 18.936 26.780 34.240 5.713
Kleibergen Paap F-statistic (∆si) 0.169 0.682 9.779 15.328
Observations 20,776 23,018 23,361 24,029
Reference group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. Small-case letters indicate logarithms. Dependent
variable: ∆(cit). Inequality measures calculated with reference groups according to education-age-cohabitation.
Each coefficient stems from a separate regression where the sample is restricted to individuals in a quartile of
the income distribution. Reference groups exclude individuals living in the same state. Demographic control
variables are first differences of age, age-squared, years of education, no. of adults in household, no. of children in
household, indicator for repeated survey completion, annual work hours, cohabitation. Reference group controls
are the changes in the group averages of the demographic controls. Instrumented: ∆c̄−i,t, ∆di(ci,t−1, c−i,t),
∆si(ci,t−1, c−i,t). Excluded instrument: ∆Windfall−i,t. Source: SOEP, v29.
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